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ABSTRACT
This study investigated the role ofmagical thinking in obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD). Magical thinking was defined as the belief that having a thought may actually
cause or increase the likelihood of an event happening to self or others. Cognitive
and psychoanalytic models ofOCD (Salkovskis, 1985; McFall and Wollersheim,
1979; Freud, 1909) have hypothesised that magical thinking or a sense of inflated
personal influence may play a significant part in the phenomenology ofOCD. Other
authors such as Tallis (1995) have suggested how a sense of inflated personal
influence might lead to the perception of excessive responsibility and guilt which also
feature significantly in cognitive theories ofOCD. Previous research findings from
studies on the phenomenology of obsessions (Kulhara and Prasad Rao, 1985) and
from the cognitive literature (Shaffan, Thordarson and Rachman, 1996) have
suggested that this beliefmay play an important role in OCD. A questionnaire
tapping magical thinking was developed for use in this study adapting methods used
in a previous study to assess magical thinking in children (Viken and Clausen, 1988).
The questionnaire consisted of 32 items looking at various aspects ofmagical
thinking. A pilot study was carried out to evaluate the feasibility of this
questionnaire. In the main study an adapted version of this questionnaire with 16
items was used to assess magical thinking in a group of adults with a diagnosis of
OCD and a control group of normal adults. There were 20 subjects in each group.
The main hypothesis was that magical thinking would be higher in the obsessional




In the past two decades, there has been increased interest in developing a clearer
understanding of the phenomenology of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).
Phenomenology has been defined as "the theory that our knowledge should be based
on immediate, ongoing experience, that is the process of attending to phenomena as
they are directly experienced...to get 'inside the mind' " (Goldenson, 1984).
Previously, the most common explanations for the aetiology ofOCD were behavioural
and biological, but in line with trends in psychology generally, a greater emphasis is
being put on the role of cognitive factors and the content of obsessional thoughts in
OCD. Tallis (1995) describes that the most meaningful way of studying the
phenomenology ofOCD is in a cognitive framework. Several cognitive models of
OCD have been put forward (Carr, 1974; McFall and Wollersheim, 1979; Salkovskis,
1989). Cognitive functioning in OCD is addressed on several levels in these theories.
These levels include cognitive events which are the person's obsessional or intrusive
thoughts and cognitive structures which are deeply held beliefs or schema about the
self and the world. These schemas influence day to day cognitive events. Cognitive
processes which are the rules used to govern cognitive events have not been so
specifically addressed in OCD although have been considered central in cognitive
models of other disorders such as depression (Beck, 1969, 1976).
In the cognitive models ofOCD, the beliefs people hold about their obsessive
thoughts are hypothesised to be central (Salkovskis, 1985). Freeston, Ladouceur,
Gagnon and Thibodeau (1993) reviewed several theoretical models ofOCD (Carr,
1974; McFall and Wollersheim, 1979; Salkovskis, 1985; Niler and Beck, 1989;
Rachman and Hodgson, 1980; Rosen, 1975). They identified nine themes as being
relevant to cognitive functioning in OCD. These themes were (1) direct or indirect
responsibility for harming, possibly harming or failing to prevent harm to the self or
another person; (2) blame and blame avoidance; (3) control of thoughts and action
and the possible consequences of not controlling such thoughts; (4) thoughts as
causing or provoking harm (5) guilt as an appropriate response to thoughts; (6) the
overestimation of negative outcomes (7) the reaction to danger; (8) the neutralisation
rather than the confrontation of thoughts; (9) the intolerability ofuncertainty. It can
be seen from these nine themes that excessive responsibility, personal extended
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influence and guilt all feature prominently in the cognitive theories of obsessive
compulsive disorder.
The overestimation of personal influence is central in cognitive models ofOCD. From
the above list, beliefs (3) "control of thoughts and the possible consequences of not
controlling such thoughts" and (4) "thoughts as causing and provoking harm" seem
particularly related to the belief that one may have personal extended influence. The
term, personal extended influence, means that an individual sees a causal relation
between their thoughts and actions and events in the world. If one held the belief that
one's thoughts could actually cause harm, it follows on logically that one would think
the control of harmful thoughts was important in order to prevent these negative
outcomes. The same overestimation of personal influence can be used to neutralise
the initial thought.
The theme of extended personal influence (which has also been termed magical
thinking) in OCD, particularly in relation to the belief that thoughts in themselves can
affect actions or events, has been an area of empirical research. In the cognitive
literature, a construct termed thought-action fusion has emerged as being potentially
important in the analysis of personal responsibility and correlated with obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman, 1996). Thought-action
fusion has two components: firstly, that having a bad thought is the moral equivalent
of carrying out a bad act and secondly, that having a thought makes an event more
likely to occur. The second part of this factor seems more relevant to the idea of a
belief in extended personal influence or magical thinking.
Other types of research in OCD have also supported the idea that the concept of
extended personal influence may be important. Firstly, studies investigating the
phenomenology of obsessions have indicated that there is a type of obsession that has
been termed "obsessive magical thinking". This type of obsession has been defined as
an "idea which is based on a magical formula of thought equals an act i.e. a thought
equals an act, harm or suffering to self or others" (Kulhara and Prasad Rao, 1985).
This same type of obsession has also been called an "obsessive conviction" in the
phenomenological literature (Goodwin and Guzes, 1989; Khanna and
Channabasavanna, 1988).
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Secondly, early psychoanalytic theory considered magical thinking to be important in
OCD. Magical thinking was often thought to be related to the fear of causing harm to
others. Psychoanalysts (Freud, 1909) hypothesised that the ritualistic behaviour is
reinforced by its seeming effectiveness in preventing harm to oneself or others. This
seemingly effective outcome strengthens the underlying magical or superstitious
thinking. Tallis (1995) has noted that while the psychoanalytic model ofOCD has not
been generally accepted, some of its ideas such as the belief in the power of thoughts
to cause harm are the focus of research in the newly developing cognitive literature.
Lastly, research has been conducted to see whether obsessive-compulsive symptoms
can be understood as pathological extremes of normal developmental stages such as
childhood rituals or of social behaviour (Leonard, Goldberger, Rapoport, Cheslow
and Swedo, 1990). In their study of children with OCD, they retrospectively studied
early childhood rituals and superstitions. No difference was found between the
experimental and control group for superstitions, although there was a difference in
number of early childhood rituals. In their discussion, the researchers suggested that
magical thinking could potentially act as a psychological marker for obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Magical thinking has been suggested by some authors to typify
the cognitive style of pre-school children (Freud, 1950; Piaget, 1950; Wilder, 1975).
In summary, research from various fields ofOCD, especially from recent cognitive
research has pointed to the possible importance ofmagical thinking in OCD. The
term magical thinking will be defined as the belief that thinking something may cause
or increase the likelihood of harm happening to selfor others. A source of confusion
is the variety of names that have been given to this concept. It is noted that other
terms such as obsessive convictions or extended personal influence have been used to
signify a similar idea and that it is also one component of the construct termed
thought-action fusion. This aim of this study is to investigate magical thinking in
OCD. In this introduction, a general overview ofOCD (including its clinical features,
epidemiology, demography, biological theories and treatments, behavioural theories
and treatments and psychoanalytic theories and treatments) will be given before going
on to review the literature that is more directly relevant to magical thinking in OCD.
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General overview of OCD
Clinicalfeatures ofobsessive-compulsive disorder
Obsessions are persistent distressing thoughts, images or impulses that are unwanted
and involuntary causing the person anxiety and distress. In an attempt to reduce or
alleviate the anxiety or distress, the person carries out a compulsion; a repetitive,
stereotyped act, which can be overt or covert. An overt compulsion is an observable
behaviour such as handwashing or checking, whereas a covert compulsion is a mental
act such as thinking a good thought to neutralise a bad thought. Carrying out a
compulsion is often viewed as a voluntary act, even though the person often does not
want to carry out the behaviour and attempts to resist the urge. Over time and with
increasing chronicity ofOCD, the need to resist may decrease. The voluntary nature
of compulsions has been questioned (Tallis, 1995). Much compulsive behaviour is
associated with reduced control and therefore researchers such as Rachman and
Hodgson (1980) view the extent of voluntary control in compulsions as on a
continuum rather than being either entirely voluntary or entirely involuntary.
Although generally compulsive behaviour has been considered to serve the function of
reducing discomfort or anxiety, carrying out a compulsion does not always lead to a
reduction in anxiety or discomfort. This seems to be especially true of checking
behaviour. Sometimes repeated checking can lead to an increase in anxiety as the
person never feels certain that they have checked correctly (Rachman and Hodgson,
1980). This means that the compulsive behaviour ends only when the individual is
exhausted rather than because their anxiety has reduced to a reasonable level.
Washing and checking are the most common compulsions. Other compulsive
symptoms include hoarding, counting and asking for reassurance. In counting rituals
the person counts words or letters or performs arithmetic calculations. Particular
numbers may have special meaning and the person has to repeat the behaviour a
certain number of times according to this number. Obsessions can centre around
contamination fears, pathological doubting, the need for symmetry, and unwanted
aggressive or sexual thoughts. Goodwin (1989) described obsessions as "being
characterised by ambivalence. The person believes and simultaneously does not
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believe". This feature ofbelieving and at the same time not believing has to be
considered when trying to assess and treat obsessional beliefs and has implications for
the development of cognitive therapy for OCD.
For obsessive-compulsive disorder to be diagnosed a person must have either
obsessions or compulsions (DSM-IV, 1994). These must "cause marked distress, are
time-consuming, or significantly interfere with the person's normal routine,
occupational functioning or usual social activities or relationships". Obsessions are
defined as being "recurrent and persistent thoughts, ideas or impulses that are
experienced at least initially as intrusive and inappropriate". These are not simply
excessive worries about real life problems. The person must attempt "to ignore or
suppress such thoughts and impulses or to neutralise them with some other thought
or action" and the person must recognise "that they are products of their own mind".
Compulsions are defined as "repetitive behaviours or mental acts that the person feels
driven to perform in response to an obsession". The compulsions must be " aimed at
preventing or reducing distress or preventing some dreaded event or situation;
however, these behaviours or mental acts are not connected in a realistic way with
what they are designed to neutralise or prevent or are clearly excessive". The person
must recognise at some time during the disorder "that the obsessions or compulsions
are excessive or unreasonable".
Epidemiology and demography ofOCD
Obsessive-compulsive disorder is estimated to affect 2 to 3% of the population
(Karno, Golding, Sorenson and Burnam, 1988) during their lifetime. The National
Institute ofMental Health (NIMH) Catchment Survey showed that OCD had a six
month point prevalence of 1.6% (Myers et al.,1984) and a lifetime prevalence of 2.5
% (Robins et al., 1984). These results indicated that obsessive-compulsive disorder
was 50 to 100 times more common than previously thought making it the fourth most
frequently occurring psychiatric disorder behind phobias, substance abuse and major
depression. Similar prevalence rates have been found in other countries such as
Canada (Bland et al., 1988; Vaisaner, 1975). There may be up to one million people
with OCD in the United Kingdom and up to five million with OCD in the United
States (Rapoport, 1989a). Previously, it had been viewed as an uncommon disorder
because of the relatively rare presentation ofOCD in mental health services. Studies
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using both outpatient and inpatient psychiatric populations had indicated that adults
and children with OCD only made up 1% to 4% of patients (Rudin, 1953; Rasmussen
and Tsuang, 1984). A person with OCD may take years to approach services and the
triggers for seeking help often include depression, anxiety, worsening obsessions or
affected social functioning (Goodwin and Guze, 1989). The average time between
onset and seeking help is seven to eight years ( Yaryura-Tobias and Neziroglu, 1983).
There have been few prospective studies looking at how obsessive-compulsive
symptoms might change over time (Jenike, 1992). Rapoport (1989a) looked at
adolescents with obsessive-compulsive disorder and found that baseline measures
were a poor predictor of the course of the disorder. It used to be thought there was a
clear differences between washers and checkers (Rachman, 1976a). Differences that
have been noted are in mode of onset, sex ratio, effect of rituals on anxiety,
fluctuations in rituals and response to behaviour therapy (Baer and Minchellio, 1986),
but more recent thinking suggests the picture is more complex than this (Tallis, 1995).
People with OCD often have multiple obsessions and compulsions which can change
over time for example from predominately checking to predominately washing
compulsions or vice versa. The course of obsessive-compulsive disorder tends to be
chronic with a waxing and waning of symptoms. Rasmussen and Tsuang (1984)
found that 85% of patients fitted into this category.
Rasmussen and Eisen (1992) found that sixty-five per cent of their subjects developed
obsessive-compulsive disorder before twenty-five years old. The mean age of onset
was 20.9 years old for both sexes, but they found that men developed symptoms
significantly earlier than women. There is some evidence for precipitating events in
OCD. Between 56% to 90% of patients with OCD can remember a precipitating
event in some studies (Rudin, 1953; Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992). However, other
research has shown that a third to a half of patients with OCD cannot recall a
precipitating event (Goodwin, Guze and Robins, 1969; Black, 1974). Precipitants can
include emotional stress at work or home or there may be an increased level of life
events in the six months before onset (Khanna et al., 1988).
OCD is equally common in males and females (Black 1974; Karno et al., 1988)
although there can be differences within the subgroups of cleaning and checking.
Women tend to experience more washing compulsions and contamination fears
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whereas men tend to suffer from obsessional slowness more frequently (Marks,
1987). OCD is twice as common in boys in childhood and adolescence (Swedo and
Rappoport, 1989). People with OCD are more likely to be single and up to 47% are
celibate (Rudin, 1953). Marital conflict has also been associated with OCD (Rachman
and Hodgson, 1980; Yaryura-Tobias and Neziroglu, 1983). Supporting evidence for
this is that Karno et al. (1988) found a relationship between OCD and separation or
divorce.
OCD also has a high rate of co-morbidity with other psychiatric disorders.
Rasmussen and Eisen (1992) found that two-thirds of their OCD sample had a lifetime
history ofmajor depression. For the majority (85%), the depression was secondary to
the OCD, but 15% experienced concurrent major depression. OCD also had a
significant overlap with anxiety disorders such as panic disorder and agoraphobia.
Aetiology and treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder
Biological theories and treatments
The first group of theories have concentrated on attempting to find an underlying
biological or physical cause for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Firstly, it has been
suggested that obsessive-compulsive disorder is caused by a specific abnormality in
the levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin in the brain. The main evidence for this
theory is that people with obsessive-compulsive disorder respond well to a group of
antidepressants termed the serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SRI) such as clomipramine
that prevent the loss of serotonin. These drugs have been shown to have specific anti
obsessional effects and clomipramine has generally had the highest levels of success
(Stein, Spadaccini and Hollander, 1995; Jenike, 1993). However, other research, for
example looking at blood serotonin has proved inconclusive about whether patients
with obsessive-compulsive disorder do have abnormal serotonin levels (Flament et al.,
1987). A second area of interest has been in the possible brain structures implicated in
obsessive-compulsive disorder. A series of neuroimaging studies have shown that
particular areas of the brain in individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder show
increased metabolic activity levels compared to a control group (Baxter et al., 1988).
PET scans have indicated that these areas are the orbital frontal cortex, cingulate
cortex and head of the caudate. Work is continuing in this area. There has also been
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research into the potential genetic factors involved in obsessive-compulsive disorder.
The results of twin studies have shown a higher rate ofOCD in monozygotic twins
compared to dizygotic twins (Carey and Gottesman, 1981), but another study has
shown that there is increasing monozygotic and dizygotic concordance as obsessional
traits or other anxiety disorders are included (MacDonald and Murray, 1989). This
gives more support for the inheritability of a predisposition to developing anxiety
disorders generally rather than specifically OCD. Other studies have looked at the
rate ofOCD in the relatives of patients with OCD. The results of five out of six
studies using DSM-III diagnostic criteria suggested that the incidence ofOCD among
relatives was less than 10% (Black et al., 1992). In parents, obsessional personality
traits seem to be more common than obsessive compulsive symptoms (Honjo et
al.,1989; Riddle et al., 1990).
Behavioural andpsychoanalytic theories and interventions
The most influential psychological theory has been learning theory which led to the
development ofbehaviour therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder. The principal
theory used to explain obsessive-compulsive disorder is the two stage learning theory
first proposed by Mowrer (1947), although there are variations on the original theory
(Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). He hypothesised that an event becomes associated
with anxiety through the mechanism of classical conditioning. In an attempt to reduce
anxiety, a compulsive behaviour is carried out. If this behaviour is successful in
decreasing the level of anxiety, the compulsive behaviour is reinforced and more likely
to occur again if anxiety is experienced. This cycle means that the person never
experiences the natural habituation of anxiety over time. Rachman and Hodgson
(1980) updated this theory to include the idea that compulsions do not always have an
anxiety reducing effect.
The main type ofbehaviour therapy used is response prevention where the person has
to stop carrying out the compulsive behaviour long enough so they can see that the
anxiety reduces eventually without carrying out an compulsion. This technique is
coupled with encouraging the person to gradually stop avoiding situations they find
anxiety provoking. Behaviour therapy has been shown to be effective in treating
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). Generally, 60 to 70%
ofpatients with compulsive rituals improved after completing treatment. However,
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behaviour therapy does have a high drop out rate of 20% (Rachman and Hodgson,
1980).
Psychoanalysts have focused on finding an underlying psychological cause for
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Freud (1909) proposed that obsessional symptoms
were defensive reactions to unconscious impulses caused by a regression to an earlier
childhood stage. He thought that obsessive-compulsive disorder is linked to the stage
of development termed the 'anal-sadistic stage' in which toilet training is a major
feature. During this stage, anger, aggression and the need for control can be
predominant themes. Also from a psychodynamic standpoint, Beiser (1987)
hypothesised that obsessive-compulsive attributes in children could be seen as part of
normal development, as a defence mechanism against urges to untidy or destroy, as a
way ofmastering deficits or as a mixture of all three. She reviewed the obsessive
compulsive behaviour that might occur during normal development. This behaviour
includes childhood rituals such as bedtime stories, the emergence of superstitious
behaviour such as avoiding stepping on cracks in the pavement and repetitive
behaviour such as repeating the same game over and over again. These behaviours
can serve various functions such as dealing with separation, assisting in the mastery
of the environment and coping in social situations. Other authors have also
hypothesised that obsessive or compulsive symptoms may be related to superstitious
or magical thinking (Freud, 1963).
Tallis (1995) states that there is little evidence to support a theory in which infant
sexuality and regression are important. He also notes that Freud was concerned with
cognition in OCD and that some of his observations about OCD are the focus of
current research. Tallis talks specifically about defensive reactions which occur to
keep unacceptable thoughts out of consciousness. If a person experiences an
obsessional thought about a harmful event happening to someone, they may carry out
an overt or covert act to undo or neutralise the thought to prevent the outcome. As
mentioned before, this behaviour is seemingly effective and this outcome reinforces
the magical thinking and the compulsive behaviour. Freud proposed that magical and
superstitious thinking and other symptoms were caused by a regression to an earlier
developmental stage which is characterised by feelings of omnipotence. Tallis (1995)
proposes that in early onset OCD which carries on into adulthood, magical thinking or
overestimation of personal influence is better seen as a developmental delay.
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Leonard et al. (1990) looked specifically at the theory that the symptoms of OCD
could be viewed as extreme variants of superstitiousness or early developmental
rituals. Ritualistic play, magical and childhood rituals and thinking, and superstitions
have all been viewed as related to obsessive-compulsive disorder (Peller, 1954;
Nemiah, 1985). Up to thirty per-cent of people with OCD develop the disorder
before the age of fifteen and childhood OCD is similar in its presentation to adult
OCD. A group of children with OCD and a control group were compared on
measures of parental report of early developmental rituals and current superstitions.
They found no difference between the groups on current superstitions and argue that
most superstitions differ in content from the common obsessions and compulsions in
childhood OCD. A difference was found in number of developmental rituals and it is
suggested that a prospective study should be conducted to see whether this result is
due to preclinical OCD or biased parental recall. They also thought that other
psychological factors which could be on a developmental continuum, such as magical
thinking, may show continuity with OCD. In terms of treatment, there is little
evidence for the efficacy of psychoanalytical treatment of obsessive-compulsive
disorder (Jenike, 1986).
The role of cognition in OCD
Firstly, three cognitive models ofOCD will now be discussed and evaluated.
Secondly, the implications of these models for the role of cognitive therapy in OCD
will be discussed.
The model ofCarr
The earliest cognitive model was formulated by Carr (1974). He hypothesised that
people with OCD tend to overestimate the possibly of negative outcomes in certain
situations and tend to overestimate the negative consequences of this outcome
occurring. These are known as distorted threat appraisals. Lazarus (1966) was the
first to introduce the idea of "threat appraisals". These appraisals are defined as the
evaluation of situations in terms of their harmful consequences. In OCD, if there is an
overestimation of harmful outcomes and consequences, this evaluation may lead to
increased anxiety levels. The anxiety triggers compulsive behaviour in an attempt to
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reduce the probability of the harmful consequences. This model has been criticised for
several reasons. Firstly, it is primarily descriptive of threat appraisals in OCD rather
than explaining them. For example, why might individuals with OCD process
situations in this way ? Secondly, it has been criticised for not being specific enough
to OCD. This model has been shown to apply to other forms of anxiety such as
agoraphobia (Butler and Matthews, 1983, McNally and Foa, 1987) and also intrusive
thoughts related to health (Freeston et al., 1994). However, this first model led to
theoretical speculation about what were the specific cognitive underpinnings ofOCD
as compared to other anxiety disorders. The theory also gave an idea of how therapy
might tackle these hypothesised overestimations of threat.
The model ofMcFall and Wollersheim
The next main theory was by McFall and Wollersheim (1979) who proposed a model
again developed within the structure of appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1966) and
perception of threat. They hypothesised that there are two stages in appraisals of
threat in OCD: a primary appraisal and a secondary appraisal. In obsessive-
compulsive disorder certain beliefs guide these appraisals which mean that people with
obsessive-compulsive disorder perceive themselves as unable to control threat and
carry out compulsive behaviour in order to reduce the possibility of the unfavourable
outcomes. The initial perception of threat is caused by the person evaluating the
danger of a event compared to their ability to cope with it. This leads to an increase
in anxiety levels which in turn leads to a secondary appraisal of the probable
consequence of their attempt to cope with the situation. The secondary appraisal can
trigger compulsive behaviour.
McFall and Wollersheim were the first to suggest specific beliefs that might underlie
OCD behaviours. They proposed that the beliefs underlying primary appraisals are
centred around the theme of the unacceptable nature of obsessional thoughts and an
inflated sense ofpersonal influence (Tallis, 1995). These include that "one is powerful
enough to initiate or prevent the occurrence of disastrous outcomes" and that "certain
thoughts and feelings are unacceptable and could lead to a catastrophe". The beliefs
that might underlie secondary appraisals also reflect these themes. For example that
"magical rituals or obsessive ruminating will circumvent feared outcomes", "it is easier
and more effective to carry out a magical ritual or to obsess than to confront one's
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feelings directly" and "feelings of uncertainty and loss of control are intolerable".
Tallis (1995) notes the similarity between the types of themes and beliefs considered
central in this model ofOCD and the types of beliefs considered in psychoanalytic
theory.
Salkovskis (1985) criticised this model for several reasons. Again, like the theory
proposed by Carr (1974), he did not think it explained OCD specifically enough and
could not differentiate between threat appraisals in OCD and other anxiety disorders.
Secondly, he thought there was no serious attempt to delineate the processes in OCD
and thirdly that there was too heavy an emphasis on preconscious and unconscious
cognitions drawn from psychoanalytic theory.
The model ofSalkovskis
Salkovskis (1985, 1989) developed a fuller cognitive theory of OCD which in
particular has stimulated much research testing out its predictions. He criticised
McFall and Wollersheims' model as not being specific enough to obsessive-compulsive
disorder and not differentiating between threat appraisals in obsessive-compulsive and
other anxiety disorders. He also did not include some of the beliefs that McFall and
Wollersheim viewed as important. However, there are many similarities between the
two models.
His theory was based on similar principles to cognitive models of depression and
anxiety developed by Beck (1967, 76). These types ofmodels hypothesise that it is a
person's interpretation of a situation that governs their emotional response. In
depression and anxiety, negative automatic thoughts occur which are characterised by
their involuntary nature and distressing content and can affect mood.
Salkovskis (1989) proposed that "clinical obsessions are intrusive cognitions, the
occurrence and content ofwhich patients interpret as an indication that they might be
responsible for harm to themselves or others unless they take action to prevent it".
Obsessive thoughts differ from automatic thoughts in that when negative automatic
thoughts occur they are generally perceived as reasonable compared to obsessions
which are generally perceived as senseless and intrusive. In obsessive-compulsive
disorder, the obsessions in themselves trigger negative automatic thoughts that lead to
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neutralising activity. He notes that intrusive thoughts are common in the general
population (Rachman and de Silva, 1978) therefore it is not the intrusive thoughts per
se which are related to OCD, but the person's reaction to these types of thoughts.
These differ in occurrence from obsessional patients, but are similar in form and
content (Rachman and de Silva, 1978). Obsessional thinking therefore has its
foundation in normal intrusive cognitions.
Underlying beliefs or dysfunctional assumptions (Beck, 1967) are hypothesised to
influence the person's reaction to intrusive thoughts. For example, if a person holds
the dysfunctional assumption that "having a bad thought is like doing a bad action",
they will react with distress if they experience a "bad" thought. When the person
carries out a ritualistic behaviour in order to reduce the distress or to neutralise the
thought, the behaviour is mediated by a cognitive factor. For example, "I acted on my
belief and felt better, therefore the beliefmust have some basis in truth". Salkovskis
notes that in the early stages ofOCD, the effort required to carry out a compulsion is
small compared to the possible awful consequences if the behaviour is not carried out.
The underlying beliefs include " having a thought about an action is like causing the
action" and "failing to prevent harm to self or others is the same as having caused the
harm in the first place".
A further part of this model relates to excessive responsibility. Salkovskis suggests
that in the normal population people hold themselves responsible for what they
actually do whereas people with OCD also hold themselves responsible for what they
fail to do. Therefore if a negative event is foreseen, however slim the probability of it
actually happening, the person is responsible for doing something to prevent it.
Responsibility has been recognised as potentially important in OCD before Salkovskis
proposed his model. Rachman and Hodgson (1980) noted a difference in people with
checking rituals at home and immediately after entering hospital. The checking rituals
decreased significantly on their entry to hospital. They suggest this was due to
reduced feelings of responsibility and therefore reduced anxiety levels in hospital. In
hospital, over time, checking can increase as the person comes more to view it as a
home. It has also been noted that anxiety reduces when a therapist is present as the
responsibility is shared. Tallis (1995) notes that reassurance seeking can often take
the form of seeming to share responsibility such as "You did see me switch the cooker
off, didn't you?". Responsibility has been thought to be particularly related to
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checking behaviour. Evidence supporting this hypothesis was from studies carried out
comparing individuals with primarily checking behaviour with those with cleaning
behaviour. A difference was found in that checkers reported less discomfort than
cleaners after being provoked. The conclusion drawn was that the checkers
experienced less discomfort because of the presence of the experimenter and it was
hypothesised that the experimenter has an inhibiting effect on discomfort levels as the
subject perceives that the experimenter shares responsibility. Secondly, checkers
experienced greater discomfort and urge to check in their own homes where they feel
most responsible (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). These studies suggested that
responsibility may be more related to checking rituals than washing rituals. As
mentioned before, this situation is complicated by the fact that many people with OCD
have both checking and washing rituals at various stages of the disorder.
Many researchers have been interested in the role of personal responsibility and in
testing out the predictions of the model proposed by Salkovskis. A series of studies
have recently been published exploring whether firstly there is a relationship between
excessive responsibility and obsessive-compulsive symptoms and secondly attempting
to clarify and measure this concept. Freeston, Ladoceur, Thibodeau and Gagnon
(1992) tested the relationship between intrusive thoughts and measures of anxious,
depressive and compulsive symptoms. Subjects were one hundred and twenty-five
university students who completed a questionnaire describing and evaluating seven
cognitive intrusions and scales of depressive, anxious and compulsive symptoms. Five
factors that emerged from the cognitive intrusions questionnaire were general distress,
evaluation, control, diversity and attention. Evaluation was the only factor found to
be a significant predictor of Compulsive Activity Checklist scores. This factor was
made up of perceived responsibility, disapproval and guilt ratings. This gave support
to the idea that responsibility is related to compulsive behaviour although this study
was carried out with a non-clinical student population. Patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder have also reported higher responsibility for outcomes related to
their thoughts (Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon and Thibodeau, 1992) and also rated
beliefs more strongly about responsibility (Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon and
Thibodeua, 1993) as compared to matched controls.
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Responsibility has been thought to be a more prevalent schema in those with checking
type ritual as opposed to contamination fears and washing and cleaning rituals.
Lopatkha and Rachman (1995) found that by reducing perceived responsibility using
an experimental manipulation, OCD subjects experienced a significant decrease in
levels of discomfort and urge to check, conversely when perceived responsibility was
increased, there was an increase in level of discomfort and urge to check, although
this increase was not statistically significant.
Further research looked at the link between increased responsibility and checking
behaviour. Ladouceur et al. (1995) compared checking behaviour under conditions of
high and low perceived responsibility using a sound recognition task in non-clinical
subjects. The high responsibility group were told that the study was for a insurance
company in order to improve security for blind people and elderly people while
crossing roads. The low responsibility group were told that the study was about
sound recognition. The results indicated that anxiety was the only variable to be
found significantly higher in the high responsibility group. The other dependent
variables (number of checks, number of errors made, and time taken to finish the task,
need to check after the task, time believed to be needed to make an extra check after
the task , subjective number of errors made, preoccupation with errors and discomfort
experienced during the task) did not differ between the two groups. A manipulation
check was also conducted looking at the perception of the probability and the severity
ofnegative consequences, the influence of the subject over the consequences and the
perceived responsibility. The authors suggested that this result might be due to task
difficulty masking differences between groups or that the manipulation to increase
responsibility may not have been powerful enough. In order to test out these
explanations, a second study was carried out looking at checking behaviour, but using
a different task, a manual classification task. This time, a significant difference was
found between the groups with the high responsibility group more frequently
hesitating, checking, and having more preoccupation with errors and anxiety during
the task. The researchers discuss the relationship between perception of danger and
perception of responsibility and suggest that the perception of danger may also play a
role in causing checking.
17
The above study demonstrates the difficulty in defining, testing and manipulating the
construct of responsibility. Rheaume, Ladoceur, Freeston and Letarte (1995) defined
responsibility as the belief that "one possess pivotal power to provoke or prevent
subjective negative outcomes". In their studies, they were looking at how subjects
assess responsibility over ambiguous situations. These situations were based around
subjects such as contamination, sexuality, verification, loss of control and magical
thinking. Three hundred and ninety seven adults were given a situation and asked to
describe a possible negative outcome which they had to rate according to probability,
severity, influence and pivotal influence. Ratings of probability and severity aimed to
measure the subject's threat appraisal whereas ratings of influence and pivotal
influence were measuring the perceived power to provoke or prevent the outcomes.
Subjects also rated perceived responsibility and personal relevance. Influence was
defined as the degree of influence subjects believed they had over the outcome
whereas pivotal influence was the part of the outcome the subjects believed to be
completely under their control. For example, if it was an office worker's job to lock
up the office at night, they may rate their level of pivotal influence as high over the
outcome of leaving the office unlocked and the office being burgled. This is because
whether or not the office is locked is completely under their control. However, if it
was another persons responsibility to lock up the office in the evenings, the person
might feel they still had some influence over the outcome, but they would probably
rate the level of pivotal influence as lower. Influence and pivotal influence more
strongly predicted responsibility ratings than severity and probability. Pivotal
influence was the strongest predictor of responsibility in this study and in a second
study controlling for the order of items. This means that if a subject believes they
have more influence over the outcome, this is the best predictor of their responsibility
ratings. These findings give support to the model ofOCD by Salkovskis. However
again this study was conducted using a non-clinical population and the authors
conclude that further research needs to compare OCD, clinical controls and normal
controls to see if a responsibility schema is important in OCD.
A general point to note about most of the research carried out in this area is that so
far non-clinical subjects groups have been used. If subjects with obsessional problems
are used, they are often chosen on the basis of a cut off point on a measure of
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology rather than having a formal diagnosis. These
shortcomings in the research means it is at times questionable how applicable these
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results are to OCD. This situation may be due to the fact that it is often difficult to
recruit subjects with OCD due to their relative rarity in mental health settings and their
reluctance to disclose (Rapoport, 1989b; Rasmussen and Tsuang, 1984).
As mentioned, another difficulty has been the variety of definitions of responsibility
and the lack of empirically tested measures of the concept. Work on developing a
reliable scale free from OCD related items has been carried out by Rachman et al.
(1995). They developed a questionnaire called the Responsibility Appraisal
Questionnaire and tested two hundred and ninety one students. The results indicated
there were four factors in the construct of responsibility. These were responsibility
for harm, responsibility in social contexts, a positive outlook towards responsibility
and thought-action fusion (TAF) which is the belief that thoughts can influence events
or are almost equivalent to actions. A revised questionnaire was developed and tested
on two hundred and thirty four students. Again, four factors were found but only the
TAF subscale was found to correlate significantly with measures of obsessionality,
guilt and depression. This correlation remained significant even when depression
scores were controlled. This, they suggest, shows that the concept of responsibility is
made up of several factors and is not a unitary concept. They also argue that evidence
does not support the idea that people with obsessive-compulsive are generally over-
responsible. Excessive responsibility seems to be specific to particular situations
rather than across all situations.
In two studies investigating TAF further, Shafran et al. (1996) have shown that
thought -action fusion is higher in an obsessional sample than a non obsessional
sample, particularly the belief that thinking about something happening increases the
risk of it happening. They suggest that thought-action fusion has two components
(1) the belief that thinking about an unacceptable or disturbing event makes it more
likely to happen (TAF-Likelihood) and (2) the belief that having an unacceptable
thought is the moral equivalent of carrying out the unacceptable or disturbing action
(TAF-Moral). The Likelihood factor is divided into two categories. Firstly,
Likelihood for others measures TAF for events happening to a friend/ relative and
secondly, Likelihood for selfmeasures TAF for events happening to oneself. In the
first study, an obsessional group numbering one hundred and forty seven was
compared with a student control group of one hundred and ninety. The obsessional
group was recruited through adverts and were included if they scored above a cut off
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of eleven on the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory. Two thirds of this
group had received a formal diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder although
their scores on the Maudsley did not differ from those without a formal diagnosis.
The other measures used were the Beck Depression Inventory and the Thought-
Action Fusion Scale. The new scale was made up of thirty four items. Twelve items
related to TAF-Moral, six to negative events happening to others, four items to
positive events happening to others (TAF-Likelihood-for-others), six to negative
events to self and four items relating to positive events happening to self (TAF
Likelihood-for-self).
A factor analysis was conducted. A three factor solution was found to explain 61.6%
of the variance of the student sample. These factors were TAF-Likelihood-for-self,
TAF-Likelihood for-others and TAF-Moral. Moderate correlations ( ranging from
.32 to .35) were found between these factors. In the obsessional sample, a two factor
solution was found to better explain the variance. The factor TAF-Likelihood did not
differentiate between self and other in the obsessional group. When comparing the
groups, a significant difference was found between TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood-
for-others, but not TAF-Likelihood for self. The authors noted that most of the
obsessional group did not state they strongly believed many of the items, but tended
to score highly on certain items. This may reflect the often idiosyncratic nature of
obsessions. A weakness of this study is that it used a cut off score as criteria for
inclusion rather than a formal diagnosis and also used an unmatched student control
group.
A second study was carried out to investigate Thought Action Fusion further, using a
revised 19 item Thought-Action Fusion Scale. The positive items were removed as
they seemed least relevant to OCD and two ambiguous items were also removed. This
study used an obsessional sample (according to the same criteria as Study 1) and two
control groups: a community sample (made up of 122 community volunteers) and a
student sample. This study found that the TAF scale correlates significantly with
cleaning and checking subscales of the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory
(MOCI). TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood-for-others was associated with compulsive
checking and cleaning in the obsessional and student groups, but not for the
community group. However, once depression had been partialled out, only the
correlation between TAF-Likelihood-for-others and the checking subscale of the
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MOCI remained significant in the obsessional group. This correlation was reduced
and this result suggests that depression may increase the likelihood ofboth TAF-
Likelihood-for-others and checking. For example, if you are depressed, this may
increase your vulnerability to TAF-Likelihood-for-others and this may in turn lead to
increased checking to stop a harmful event from happening. Another explanation
could be that depression affects checking and TAF-Likelihood for-others
independently. Again, the obsessional group tended to believe in TAF-Likelihood-
for-others to a similar extent as they believed in TAF-Likelihood-for-self whereas the
control groups rated TAF-Likelihood-for-selfmore than TAF-Likelihood-for others.
The authors suggest that a belief in TAF-Likelihood-for-self can be explained by "self-
fulfilling prophecies". If a person has a positive or negative thought, this may affect
their future behaviour and therefore influence future events. Therefore your own
thoughts may have an influence over your own behaviour and future events.
However, the influence of your own thoughts on events happening to another person
cannot have the same effect. The obsessional sample did not distinguish between
these two components, indicating that they believed their thoughts could have an
equal effect on their own and others behaviour.
The factor, TAF-Likelihood-for-others, relates back to the idea of extended personal
influence which has been a theme throughout the cognitive models. The researchers
suggest that obsessional-compulsive symptoms with TAF are particularly likely to
experience a sense of inflated responsibility. TAF is viewed as an internal trigger for
responsibility as differentiated from the external triggers such as no-one else being
there. They hypothesise that cultural factors such as religious beliefs may play a role
in its development. One intriguing fact is that a person can believe that if they think
about a car crash, this means it is more likely to happen, yet if they have a thought
about someone falling ill, they do not believe that this makes it more likely to happen.
This suggests that a person with OCD often does not hold the general belief that
thoughts can influence events, but only in certain situations. For example, people with
OCD do not differ from a control group in their rating of thought-action fusion for
positive events such as winning the lottery. Therefore they do not believe that
thinking about winning the lottery or other positive events make them more likely to
happen (Shafran et al.,1996). This difference may be partially explained by the nature
ofbeliefs in OCD as discussed by Goodwin (1989). He suggested that obsessive
convictions and magical thinking were characterised by believing yet not believing.
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Different hypotheses, such as the role of cultural factors, have been put forward to
explain how thought-action fusion might develop. One suggestion has been the role of
early or past experience. Tallis (1994) described two case studies where magical
thinking or the fusion of thoughts and actions seemed important in the aetiology of
obsessive compulsive disorder. The first case was a woman who experienced
intrusive thoughts, repeated checking and repeated doubts about whether she had
harmed someone. As a child, she had prayed that her grandfather would die and the
next day he died. Also, as an adult she had a violent argument with her mother and
two weeks later her mother was diagnosed with cancer. In the second case, a woman
experienced intrusive thoughts, checking behaviour and number rituals. She found it
difficult to distinguish thought from action and would worry that she had put poison
into food. Again, as a teenager, she had wished that her father would be taken away
and he died in an accident two weeks later. He related these cases to the cognitive
theories of emotion which stress the importance of early experiences in the
development of dysfunctional beliefs. In both these cases, an early learning experience
appeared to lead to the formation of the belief that thinking about something bad will
result in its actual occurrence.
In summary, much recent research has investigated the concept of personal
responsibility and its relation to obsessive and compulsive symptoms in non-clinical
and clinical populations. Positive results have been found suggesting there may be a
link between inflated responsibility and obsessive and compulsive symptoms.
Problems in this field have been the use of non-clinical samples and the obvious
complexity of the construct of responsibility. Responsibility is not a unitary concept
(Rachman et al.,1995) and different factors seem to be more related to obsessive and
compulsive symptoms than others. One construct termed thought-action fusion
developed from research looking at the construct of responsibility has been found to
be related to measures of obsessional and compulsive symptoms in a clinical
population.
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Cognitive therapy for OCD
Cognitive therapy for OCD is still at its early stages of development and there have
only been a few outcome studies. Van Oppen and Arntz (1994) have described some
of the specific cognitive techniques drawn from cognitive therapy of anxiety and
depression (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985) which have been used in the treatment of
obsessions and compulsions. The first group of interventions focus on changing
estimations of catastrophe. There are two aspects to this: firstly, the overestimation
of danger and secondly, the overestimation of the consequences of danger. The
authors give an example of these overestimationa as " If I don't extinguish my
cigarette, the house will burn down". Strategies to address the overestimation of
danger include working out the probability of the feared event occurring and
comparing this to the person's perceived probability of the event occurring. A second
strategy is to carry out behavioural experiments. They give the example of asking the
client writing the wrong account number on the cheque and testing whether the feared
consequences occur. The second area targeted for therapy is to change the
overestimation of responsibility. They suggest that responsibility is made up of two
factors: the overestimation of the amount of responsibility and secondly, the
overestimation of the consequences of having been responsible. They suggest that the
core assumptions of the person are linked to their perception of the consequences of
responsibility. A specific technique for this is the pie-technique where the person lists
all the possible contributing factors to a particular outcome and rates how important
each one is. A second method is to ask the person how responsible they would think a
friend or another person would be if a certain catastrophe happened to them. Lastly,
behavioural experiments can also be used to challenge the belief in the consequences
of responsibility. For particular dysfunctional assumptions, the downward arrow has
been used. Instead of challenging the person's thoughts and beliefs, they are asked
"Supposing that were true, what would that mean?"
The only well-controlled study looking at the effectiveness of cognitive therapy for
OCD was carried out by Van Oppen et al. (1995). A cognitive therapy condition was
compared to a behaviour therapy condition. Subjects were assessed on a variety of
measures including the Padua Inventory-Revised, the Irrational Beliefs Inventory and
the Anxiety Discomfort Scale. The results showed that both groups improved
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significantly on most measures and that there were no significant differences between
the groups. The effect sizes were slightly higher in the cognitive therapy group. Other
studies have been carried out (Emmelkamp, van der Helm, van Zanten and Plochg,
1980; Emmelkamp and Beens, 1991) also giving some support for the effectiveness of
these types of techniques.
Problems have been noted with cognitive therapy for OCD (Van Oppen and Arntz,
1994; Tallis, 1995). Firstly, some clients with OCD may not be able to report their
thoughts and beliefs. Secondly, these types of techniques are often more successful
with patients who are more intellectually able and have more abstract thinking skills.
However, this problem has been noted in the application of cognitive therapy
generally and techniques can be adapted and simplified. Thirdly, patients with
ruminations can use the Socratic technique as a way of reassurance seeking. Lastly,
behavioural experiments cannot be applied to all beliefs as sometimes the feared
consequence is only expected to occur in the long term and is not amenable to short
term behavioural experiments.
There have been other proposed developments in cognitive therapy looking more
specifically at the psychological consequences of fusing thought and action or having
a sense of inflated personal influence. Rachman (1993) proposes that one aim of
therapy might be to help the person distinguish between obsessional thought and
obsessional action. Tallis (1994) presents two cases where because of a specific
learning experience, the person learnt that thoughts could affect events or other
people. He hypothesises the role of specific learning experiences may contribute to
the development of beliefs which may be related to certain obsessional symptoms
such as thought-action fusion and suggests that if this belief has resulted from a
congruent experience, the most appropriate treatment model might be similar to that
used for the challenging of delusions. He compares the formation of these types of
beliefs in OCD to the theories about the formation of delusions. For example, Maher
(1988) has argued that delusions are rational responses to explain abnormal or
anomalous experiences. Tallis cites the delusion modification model as suggested by
Watts, Powell and Austin (1979) in which the person is encouraged to consider
alternative explanations for the seeming link between thoughts and actions. This type
of theory or application of cognitive therapy techniques to specific types of
obsessional and compulsive symptoms is at an early stage.
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Phenomenology of obsessions
This section reviews research looking more specifically at the phenomenology of
obsessions. Khanna and Channabasavanna (1988) reviewed the case notes of412
patients with obsessive compulsive disorder seen between 1975 and 1984 in a
Psychiatry Outpatient clinic in India. A psychiatrist had given each of these patients a
diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder according to both ICD-9 and DSM-III
criteria. One hundred and sixty patients had been seen subsequently and the diagnosis
confirmed. From the files, 761 obsessions were recorded and classified according to
form and content. The form of obsessions could be (1) obsessional thoughts-
thoughts which repeatedly intrude into consciousness (2) obsessional doubts e.g.
doubts about having completed daily activities (3) obsessional fears e.g. fear of getting
dirty etc. (4) obsessional urges - these are powerful impulses to carry out certain acts
(5) obsessional images and (6) obsessive convictions - these are often based on the
magical formula of thought equalling an act. The content of obsessions was
categorised as dirt/contamination, religion, sex, death, illness, aggression, harm, past,
daily activity, inanimate-personal and others. In this sample, obsessive convictions
made up 9.08% of all obsessions. They were most commonly recorded as about daily
activities and inanimate-personal. Unfortunately, the authors did not define the
inanimate-personal category. Khanna and Channabasavanna said that rituals are often
associated with obsessive convictions. This study used a large sample, but a
shortcoming is that it relied on a retrospective analysis of case notes rather than direct
interviews with subjects. Case notes can often be unreliable and open to individual
variance in the quality and type of information.
Another Indian study by Kulhara and Prasad Rao (1985) looked at the
phenomenology of obsessions and compulsions. A similar design was employed to
the study by Khanna and Channabasavanna in which the researchers reviewed the case
notes of patients who met the Research Diagnostic Criteria for obsessive compulsive
disorder. Seventy two cases were identified. Obsessions were categorised as
obsessive doubts, obsessive thoughts, obsessive fears, obsessive impulses, obsessive
images, miscellaneous and obsessive magical thinking. Obsessive magical thinking
was defined almost exactly as obsessive convictions were defined in the previous
study by Khanna and Channabasavanna (1988). Again, they defined obsessive
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magical thinking as based on the magical formula of thought equalling an act, harm or
suffering to others. The results showed that magical thinking accounted for 36.1% of
all obsessions in this sample and occurred in 26 out of the 72 subjects. The authors
state that they think magical thinking is a more suitable term for this concept than
convictions and that it requires further investigation. These results suggest that not
everyone with OCD has magical thinking, but a significant proportion do. Again these
results are restricted by the fact the researchers relied on retrospective analysis of case
notes. To overcome these weaknesses, the main aim of the present study was to
investigate magical thinking through questionnaires and individual interviews with
subjects. Magical thinking or the belief in extended personal influence is not a
phenomenon restricted to OCD and has also been widely researched in other areas of
psychology. The next part of the discussion will look at magical thinking or extended
personal influence in normal adults, other psychiatric disorders and young children.
Magical thinking in non-OCD populations
Magical thinking has been viewed as common in children (Piaget,1929; Freud, 1950)
and in traditional societies (Tylor, 1871/1974; Mauss, 1902/1972). Social
anthropologists studying traditional cultures early in this century and late last century
hypothesised that two laws could explain magical thinking and rituals. The law of
contagion states that things that have been in contact with each other may influence
each other after the cessation of actual contact. For example, a touch of a lucky
charm could make someone lucky at gambling. The second law, the law of similarity
states that things that resemble each other share fundamental properties. For example,
that if you tear someone's photograph that this will harm them.
Research has also shown that these laws apply to American adults (Rozin et al., 1986,
1989) and that magical thinking or rituals are not uncommon in adults in Western
societies. Gmelch and Felson (1980) found that approximately 70% of the adults in
their study had carried out magical rituals or superstitions. These types of rituals
seem to be particularly common in competitive sports and are thought to be related to
anxiety and worries about performance. Certain factors seem to be associated with
magical thinking such as lack of information and conditions ofuncertainty. Jahoda
(1969) suggested that superstitions are more likely to occur when people do not feel
in control and engaging in superstitious behaviour creates the feeling of having some
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control over events. Similarities can be seen between the functions of obsessions and
compulsions and superstitions in gaining control over future events and reducing
anxiety.
Superstitiousness and obsessive compulsive symptoms have been found to be common
in normal populations (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980; Marmor, 1956). Frost et al.
(1993) showed that superstitious beliefs and behaviours correlated with measures of
compulsivity and obsessionality in a non-clinical population. The measures of
superstitiousness used were the Lucky Beliefs Questionnaire (included items such as
"some numbers are lucky" and "crossing your fingers brings good luck") and the
Lucky Behaviours Questionnaire which measured the frequency of superstiousness
behaviours such as "avoid doing things on Friday 13th". The Maudsley Obsessional-
Compulsive Inventory, the Compulsive Activity Checklist - Revised and the Obsessive
Thoughts Questionnaire were used to measure obsessive and compulsive symptoms.
Superstitiousness was related to compulsive checking, but not to compulsive washing.
The authors discuss these results with relation to the concept of perceived control and
also note that superstiousness is related to checking, but not washing symptoms.
However, Leonard, Goldberger, Rapoport, Cheslow and Swedo (1990) compared a
group of children with OCD and a control group on measures of early developmental
rituals and current superstitions. They found no difference between the groups on
current superstitions and argue that most superstitions differ in intensity, context and
role from the common obsessions and compulsions in childhood OCD. The only
similarity the researchers note is that anxiety worsens both OCD rituals and
superstitious behaviour. Superstiousness has not been systematically studied in an
adult population with OCD and this was one aim of the present study.
In other work looking at the relationship between stress and magical thinking, Keinan
(1994) gave a very general definition ofmagical thinking; that any explanation of a
behaviour or an experience that contradicts the laws of nature may be seen as
reflecting magical thinking. This usually means that there is a lack of empirical
scientific evidence for the explanation of the event or behaviour. More specifically
Zusne and Jones (1989) defined magical thinking as a belief that either a transfer of
energy or information between physical systems may take place solely because of their
similarity or contiguity in time or place; or that one's thoughts, words or actions can
achieve specific physical effects not governed by the principles of ordinary
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transmission or energy. Both these definitions stress the fact that these are beliefs
people have about the world which are not supported by hard, scientific evidence.
The latter definition allows for the fact that people can hold these beliefs to varying
degrees and that it is not a black or white concept. As mentioned, in obsessive-
compulsive disorder specifically, magical thinking was defined as the belief that a
"thought equals an act, harm or suffering to others" (Kulhara and Prasad-Rao, 1985).
This seems to be more related to the second part of the definition by Zusne and Jones
(1989); that one's thoughts can have specific physical effects.
Keinan's study (1994) explored the relationship between psychological stress and
magical thinking and how this relationship might be affected by a person's ability to
tolerate ambiguity. Questionnaires looking at magical thinking and tolerance of
ambiguity were administered to 174 Israelis during the GulfWar. The group was
divided into high stress (people living in areas exposed to missile attacks) or low
stress (people who lived in areas not exposed to missile attacks). The results indicated
that subjects in a high stress condition (living in areas exposed to missile attacks)
showed a significantly higher frequency ofmagical thinking than subjects in a low
stress condition (not exposed to missile attacks). In addition, high stress levels had a
more pronounced effect on magical thinking in subjects with a low tolerance of
ambiguity. The author explained this result in terms of the theory of personal control.
When a person is in a situation where they feel helpless or out of control, efforts are
often made to regain a sense of control. Magical thinking may emerge because it can
help to explain phenomena which the person cannot explain and because through
magical rituals, the person can gain a feeling of control. In this study, subjects with a
low tolerance of ambiguity appeared more prone to magical thinking.
Keinan suggested that this may mean that people with a low tolerance of ambiguity
may perceive any situation that cannot be adequately categorised as threatening. This
may mean that they are more likely to experience stress and therefore have more
magical thinking. She also concluded that magical thinking does occur in "normal"
adults, but that they manage to suppress it in most normal circumstances. She also
described how people who hold magical beliefs are often aware that these are
irrational, but how they are still unable control them. She gave the example of
soldiers or students before an exam, who know such rituals are irrational, but they
perform them just in case. Some parallels can be seen with OCD. In OCD, people
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can feel a reduced sense of control and will perform rituals just in case a negative
outcome might occur. They also often view their obsessive thoughts and rituals as
senseless and irrational.
Magical thinking andpsychotic disorders
There has been evidence for the role ofmagical thinking in psychotic disorders such as
schizophrenia or schizotypal personality disorder. Magical thinking has been shown
to be related to schizophrenia (George and Neufeld, 1987) and other measures of
schizotypy (Tobacyk and Wilkinson, 1990). Meehl(1962) initially proposed that
individuals who are prone to developing schizophrenia often show magical beliefs.
Spitzer, Endicott and Gibbon (1979) in a review of case records found magical
ideation to be a major symptom in people with borderline schizophrenia. It is also part
of the diagnostic criteria for schizotypal personality disorder. A questionnaire termed
the Magical Ideation Scale which looks at a general belief in magical phenomena was
developed as part of a package of questionnaires used to assess proneness to
developing schizophrenia. This questionnaire consists of thirty items including items
such as " Horoscopes are right too often for it to be a coincidence", "At times, I
perform certain little rituals to ward off negative influences" and "Some people can
make me aware of them just by thinking about me". Subjects have to rate each of the
items as either true or false. This questionnaire is generally administered along with
the Physical Anhedonia Scale which assesses a deficit in the ability to experience
physical pleasure and the Perceptual Aberration Scale which assesses distortion in
body perception.
Eckblad and Chapman (1983) carried out a study testing this questionnaire. In all,
1,512 students completed the questionnaire. Eckblad defines magical ideation as a
belief, quasi-belief or semi-serious entertainment of the possibility that events which
according to the causal concepts of this culture cannot have a causal relation with
each other might somehow nevertheless do. From this sample, twenty eight were
selected who scored 1.91 standard deviations above the mean on the scale and
compared with a control group using a psychiatric interview. It was found that those
in the experimental group reported more psychotic or psychotic like symptoms, more
schizotypal experiences and more evidence ofmagical thoughts. These questionnaires
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have shown magical ideation to be correlated with measures of manic depression
(Thalbourne and French, 1995) and other psychiatric disorders.
Interestingly, recent research has used the above measures of psychosis proneness and
correlated them with measures of obsessive and compulsive symptoms. There has
been debate about the relationship of obsessive compulsive disorder to anxiety
disorders, mood disorders and schizophrenia. Norman, Davies, Malla, Cortes and
Nicholson (1996) conducted a study looking at the relationship between measures of
schizotypy (using the Magical Ideation Scale), anxiety, depression and obsessive
compulsive symptoms. The measures used were the Maudsley Obsessional-
Compulsive Inventory, the Padua Inventory, the Magical Ideation Scale, the
Perceptual Aberration Scale, the Beck Anxiety Inventory, the Beck Depression
Inventory and the Hamilton Rating Scales for depression and anxiety. The results
indicated that obsessive and compulsive symptoms are more strongly correlated with
measures of schizotypy than measures of anxiety and depression. The authors discuss
the possible implications of these results for the categorisation of OCD as an anxiety
disorder and suggest that OCD may be more closely linked to the schizophrenic
spectrum of disorders. The measures used in this study explore magical thinking and
beliefs in unusual methods of causation. The authors hypothesise that a tendency
towards magical thinking may be an area of similarity between schizophrenia and
obsessive-compulsive characteristics. Tallis (1995) also has commented on the
similarities between some beliefs in OCD and delusions. A weakness of this study is
that a clinical sample of 117 general psychiatric outpatients was used, mostly with
diagnoses of anxiety and depression. Only four of the sample had a diagnosis of
obsessive compulsive disorder therefore it is unclear how applicable the results of this
study are to OCD. In the present study, a key aim is to study magical thinking in a
group of adults with OCD.
Magical thinking in children
Magical thinking and behaviour has often been theorised to be more prevalent in
children. This idea has been important in the developmental theories ofPiaget (1950)
and also Freud (1950). Piaget proposed a stage from 2 to 6 years old where children
actually believe they can cause an event merely by thinking about it. He believed that
as a child gets older, 'rational' thought begins to increase and magical thinking
30
decreases. Freud also favoured the idea that during early development children go
through a stage in which they are self centred and overestimate their ability to affect
their environment. He thought that magical thinking was a logical outcome of these
two factors. More recently, Rothbaum and Weisz (1988) suggested that children
went through a magical stage from 2 to 6 years old where they believed that other
people and events could be affected by thoughts and behaviour.
Little systematic research was conducted testing their ideas. More recent research has
indicated that the picture may be more complicated than this and that these theories
underestimate the cognitive abilities of young children. Harris (1994) states that recent
research has indicated that children can and do interpret or understand many events
and behaviours according to causal principles at a young age. For example, children
can explain events rationally such as physical actions, psychological responses or
biological changes.
Research has been conducted exploring young children's reactions to and explanations
of breaches of these rules. Results have indicated that even babies as young as six
months old show surprise by increased looking when circumstances occur which
breach normal causal principles. Baillargeon (1986) showed that when an object such
as a hand passes through a screen young infants showed surprise indicated by
increased looking. They were also surprised when an object moved from one place
to another without seeing the path the object takes. These findings showed that
children do have an understanding of causal principles such as that an object cannot
pass through another object or an object cannot move from one place to another
without an obvious path and show surprise when these types of rules are broken. This
is evidence against the idea that children's cognition is characterised by magical
thinking and that rational thinking does not appear until later.
Research has also looked more specifically into children's beliefs about magic using
older children who can give more insight into their understanding of situations.
Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling and Gelman (1994) explored 4 and 5 year old children's
explanations of possible and impossible animal transformations. A possible
transformation was a small squirrel growing into a large squirrel. An impossible
transformation was a large squirrel turning into a small squirrel. Children judged that
the second type of explanation could not occur. Unlike adults, they also thought a
31
magician could cause either type of transformation. Later questioning suggested that
children were unlikely to think of tricks or deceptions as an explanation for the
impossible transformation. Johnston and Harris (1994) also conducted an experiment
where different events were described to young children involving disappearance,
action, creation or a shift of identity. Events were presented in pairs and for one of
each pair, a causal principle was broken. Children judged that magic was responsible
for the event which violated the causal principle. Chandler and Lalonde (1994) found
that most pre-schoolers at first explained the apparent passage of a screen through a
block as magic, but in later trials involving the same children, children became more
suspicious and eventually explained it as deception or trickery. This is evidence
against the idea that young children's cognition is dominated by magical thinking.
Children do seem to understand causal principles and are able to explain events using
these principles, but there is evidence for the idea that children do believe in magic in a
particular class of events that violate normal causal rules.
A study was carried out by Viken and Clausen (1988) looking specifically at the idea
that others or events could be controlled by wishing or by magical behaviour. The
study was in two parts and tested ninety-six children, forty-eight four year olds and
forty-eight six year olds. The first part looked at children's knowledge of realistic
ways of influencing other people such as positive reinforcement. The second part
looked at children's beliefs in being able to control or influence another person's
thoughts, actions or behaviours by thinking or by magical behaviour. The children
were shown two drawings; one was of a child in a nursery and the second was of
another person (mother or peer) in a separate house. The subject was told that the
child wants the person in the other drawing to do, think or feel something. When
testing belief in control by thinking the subjects were asked "what do you think the
mother will feel if the child wishes that the mother will feel happy?". This procedure
was carried out in four categories: positive wishing, negative wishing, positive magical
behaviour and negative magical behaviour. Answers indicating a belief in magical
thinking were followed up by asking children to rate how effective this would be on a
5 point scale.
Results indicated that beliefs in the ability to influence others by thinking and by
magical behaviour were present in 94% of children. As previous research would
suggest, children also understood the effects of the realistic ways of influencing
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others. There was no difference in the childrens' beliefs in the efficacy ofwishing for
positive outcomes as opposed to negative outcomes. Children believed that magical
behaviour was more effective than wishing. The authors concluded that there was
strong evidence of a belief in control by thinking in 4 and 6 year old children, but not
for a specific magical developmental stage. They proposed that there are two parallel
sorts of control beliefs in children. One is about controlling others by behaviour and
another aimed at controlling by mental processes such as anticipating. They suggest
that in the development of the second type ofbelief, young children will attribute
unrealistic power to thinking and to other mental processes due to lack of experience.
Problems in the development of beliefs about mental processes may play a role in
schizophrenia. However, it may also be a factor in the development of obsessive-
compulsive disorder as evidence has shown that some people with obsessive
compulsive disorder do show magical thinking.
In summary, research from various areas suggests that magical thinking or the belief in
personal extended influence may be an important concept in OCD as well as in other
populations. Magical thinking and superstitious rituals have been shown to occur in
non-clinical populations (Gmelch and Felson, 1980; Rozin et al.,1986,1989) and have
been associated with factors such as stress, low tolerance of ambiguity, lack of
information and lack of perceived control (Keinan, 1994; Jahoda,1969). Measures of
obsessionality and compulsivity have been shown to correlate with measures of
superstiousness in a non-clinical population (Frost et al.,1993). A self-report
questionnaire termed the Magical Ideation Scale which taps magical thinking or the
belief in unusual methods of causation has been used to measure proneness to
developing schizophrenia. Measures of obsessions and compulsions have been found
to correlate more highly with the Magical Ideation Scale and other measures of
schizotypy than with measures of anxiety and depression in a psychiatric out-patient
population (Normans et al., 1996). There is also evidence that young children hold the
belief that other people can be influenced by thinking or by magical behaviour (Viken
and Clausen, 1988).
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Aim of the present study
The aim of the present study is to investigate magical thinking in adults with
obsessive-compulsive disorder. There has been empirical evidence from various types
of research that indicates that magical thinking may be associated with obsessive and
compulsive symptoms and may be present in a proportion of people with OCD
(Khanna and Channabasavanna, 1988; Kulhara and Prasad Rao, 1985; Frost et al.,
1993; Norman et al., 1996). However, most previous studies have either used non¬
clinical or general psychiatric samples or relied on the retrospective analysis of case
notes. This limits the reliability and validity of the findings especially in relation to
OCD. Some studies have looked at one aspect ofmagical thinking, the belief in the
power of thoughts to affect events (Shafran et al., 1996), but this study will widen the
definition to look at the belief that thinking can affect events and another person's
thoughts, behaviour or feelings.
The study is looking specifically at the belief that thoughts on their own can have the
power to influence other people or events. In the present study, measures used with
children to assess beliefs in magical thinking (Viken and Clausen, 1988) have been
adapted for use with an adult OCD sample and a control group. These types of
measures involving scenarios about other people were chosen in order to try to tap a
general belief in magical thinking without directly asking the person about their
attitudes to their own thoughts. One aim of the study was to see whether people with
OCD had a general belief in the power of thoughts to affect events rather than just the
belief in the power of their own thoughts to affect events.
In the Viken and Clausen study, drawings were used to assess the child's belief in
magical thinking. In this study, a questionnaire (called the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire) was developed to test out the various aspects of the belief in magical
thinking. Similar to the Viken and Clausen study, two people are described in the
questionnaire. One person is the influencer who attempts to influence the other
person's behaviour, thoughts, feeling or events. A series of situations were developed
by the researcher where one person (the influencer) is thinking about something
happening to the other person (the influencee). An example situation about
influencing events is that the influencer is described as thinking that the influencee's
house had been broken into. The subject has to rate the degree of influence thinking
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about this outcome will have over the actual outcome i.e. how much will thinking
about the house being burgled, affect whether the house is actually burgled.
The questionnaire includes magical thinking about influencing another's behaviour,
thoughts or feelings and about events happening to another person. These aspects
were further divided into thinking about positive/neutral outcomes or negative
outcomes as in the Viken and Clausen study. Previous research has indicated that in
OCD people are more concerned about influencing negative events rather than
positive events (Shafran et al., 1996). An extra dimension was introduced into this
study. In the Viken and Clausen study all the thinking is deliberate. The child is
wishing intentionally for something to happen. In OCD, the person is generally not
wishing for something good or bad to happen. Rather, they suddenly and frequently
experience intrusive, distressing thoughts which they do not wish to have. They may
then worry that having this thought has increased the likelihood of an event occurring
or of harm happening to another person. Therefore in this study, both intentional or
non-intentional thoughts were included to compare the differences in beliefs about
these two types of thoughts.
Another aim of this study was to investigate the possible causes of these types of
beliefs. Tallis (1994) suggested that these types of beliefs might be caused by specific
learning experiences where a person has thought about something bad happening and
then it coincidentally actually happened. He hypothesised that this early experience
may lead to the development of dysfunctional assumptions which influence obsessive
and/or compulsive behaviour. Therefore, in the present study in order to investigate
the role of early experiences in the development of beliefs about personal extended
influence, the subject will be asked if they remember an incident when they thought




Following on from the aims of the study, the main hypothesis is that people with OCD
will rate as higher the degree of influence thoughts have in affecting events, behaviour,
thoughts or feelings than the control group. Secondly, it is hypothesised that subjects
with OCD, but not control subjects will rate as higher the degree of influence non-
intentional thoughts have compared to intentional thoughts. Thirdly, from descriptions
of the clinical features ofOCD, it seems that people with OCD are particularly
worried about being responsible for causing harmful events or behaviours such as car
accidents than about affecting anothers thoughts and feelings which is often thought
to be more a feature of psychotic illnesses such as schizophrenia (Eckblad and
Chapman, 1983). Therefore, it is hypothesised that subjects with OCD will rate the
degree ofbelief as higher about thoughts affecting events and behaviours than
thoughts affecting thoughts and feelings. Fourthly, it is hypothesised that the OCD
group will rate the degree of influence as significantly higher for negative outcomes
compared to positive outcomes (Shafran et al., 1996). Fifthly, it is predicted that the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire will correlate significantly with the Likelihood factor
of the Thought Action Fusion Scale and the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive
Inventory -Revised, especially the checking subscale. The checking subscale of the
MOCI has been found to correlate significantly with the TAF- Likelihood-for-others
(Shafran et al., 1996) and measures of superstitiousness (Frost et al., 1993). Finally, it
is hypothesised that people who remember an event where they thought about an
incident and then it happened will score significantly higher on the Magical Thinking




This study was approved by Lothian Health Board and Highland Health Board Ethics
Committees.
Experiment A
The aim of the first experiment was a pilot study to test out the feasibility of the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire as a measure for use with adults with OCD. This
was because it was newly developed and specifically designed for this study.
Subjects
Six subjects (2 males, 4 females) with a diagnosis ofOCD were recruited from local
Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Departments. The mean age of the subjects was
M= 31.83 years (SD= 2.64) and mean number of years in education was M= 12.667
(SD= 2.422). Three subjects were currently receiving psychological therapy for OCD
and three subjects were currently receiving pharmacological help for OCD. All
subjects had previously received (within last year) or were currently receiving either
psychological or pharmacological treatment for OCD. Six normal control subjects (2
males, 4 females) were also recruited. The mean age of the control subjects was M
= 34.17 years (SD= 10.03) and the mean number of years in education was M=
13.667 (SD= 2.66). In order to control for the presence of psychopathology in the
control group, control subjects had to score below 33 on the Maudsley Obsessional
Compulsive Inventory-Revised and /or below 10 on the Beck Depression Inventory to
be included in the study.
Procedure
Subjects were recruited in a variety ofways depending on whether they were currently
being seen by mental health services. Letters giving information about the study were
sent to local psychiatry and psychology departments, community mental health teams
and a local department of psychotherapy. Psychologists, community psychiatric
37
nurses and psychiatrists were also contacted individually to ask for assistance in
recruiting subjects. The researcher was not currently working in local psychology
departments. If their therapist agreed to help, subjects with OCD who were currently
attending either a psychologist, psychiatrist or CPN were introduced to the study by
their principal therapist (not the researcher). They were given information about the
research, given a research information sheet (see Appendix 1) and asked whether they
would like to attend an introductory interview. If the subject agreed to be contacted,
an introductory letter was sent inviting them to an interview (see Appendix 2) .
Interviews could take place at a hospital, G.P. surgery or home visit depending on the
preference of the subject. A research information sheet, a consent form, confirmation
slip and a stamped addressed envelope were also enclosed with the introductory letter.
The research information sheet gave brief details about the aims of the study and the
procedures involved. Subjects were asked to read the research information sheet, to
send the confirmation slip back using the stamped addressed envelope either
confirming the interview, declining the interview or requesting a different interview
time. Subjects were also asked to bring the consent forms to the interview. Subjects
who had previously been seen by psychiatry or psychology services ( in the previous
year) were only contacted, after their previous therapist's or G.P.'s permission had
been obtained. Again, an introductory letter with a consent form, research
information slip, SAE and confirmation slip was sent. If the patient refused to
participate or did not reply to this initial contact, they were not contacted again.
Subjects were also recruited through a local self-help group. In this case, the
researcher met with the subjects at the group to give information about the study and
arranged appointments with each subject individually. At the initial interview, further
details were given about the study and the opportunity given for the subject to ask
any questions they might have. Subjects were given time to think about their decision
to take part and another appointment could be arranged if they could not decide
during this interview. If subjects agreed to participate in the study, informed consent
signatures were obtained. It was emphasised to the subject that they were free to stop
at any point if they became uncomfortable. Subjects were also asked for permission to
audiotape the interview. After informed consent was obtained, a short clinical
interview was first carried out lasting approximately fifteen to thirty minutes. The first
part of this interview covered demographic details including age, date ofbirth,
occupation, years in education (as measured by number of years at school and in
higher education), postcode and name and address of their General Practitioner. The
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second part of the interview focused on the subject's obsessive and/or compulsive
symptoms. Subjects were asked whether they were currently receiving or had
previously received treatment for obsessive and/or compulsive problems. If the
person said that they had, further details of the treatment were requested including
type of treatment (e.g. behaviour therapy, cognitive therapy, medication), length of
treatment, whether it was current or previous treatment, and if it had been previous,
dates of treatment. Subjects were also asked more specifically if they were taking any
medication currently for obsessive or compulsive problems. If the subject said they
were taking medication, they were asked specifically about the type ofmedication and
how long had they been taking it. After this, the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
section from the SCID-P (W/PSY SCREEN, Version 1.0), was conducted, in order
to assess whether the subject met DSM-IV criteria. After the clinical interview and
the timed task, the subjects were asked to complete the battery of self-report
questionnaires as described in the measures section. The instructions of each
questionnaire were explained to the subject. Depending on the preference of the
subject, the researcher would read out the questionnaire items or the person
completed them with no assistance. Other questionnaires were also given out, but
these were part of another study. Subjects were given the choice of completing all the
questionnaires in one interview, of taking the Beck Anxiety Inventory, Beck
Depression Inventory and/or Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory-Revised
home and sending them back or of arranging a second session to complete the
questionnaires. The session lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours. At the end of the
interview the person had the opportunity to ask any questions about the research and
were given the choice of taking a short self-help leaflet about OCD. The control
group were not interviewed directly. A set of questionnaires with a front sheet asking
for basic demographic details (age, sex, years in school and higher education) so the
groups could be matched were given out. Control subjects filled out the
questionnaires independently and returned them by post to the researcher.
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Measures
Magical Thinking Questionnaire (MTO)
This measure was designed specifically for this study (see Appendix 3) to assess the
subjects' magical thinking and was adapted from a study looking at magical thinking
in children (Viken and Clausen, 1988). The questionnaire was developed by making
up different scenarios looking at the various aspects ofmagical thinking (see Table 1).
There were 32 items in the questionnaire. Sixteen looked at intentional thoughts and
sixteen looked at non-intentional thoughts. Each of these sixteen broke down into
eight positive outcomes and eight negative outcomes and then into four thoughts, four
feelings, four events and four behaviours. Therefore, there were eight items in
positive intentional magical thinking (two thoughts, two feelings, two events and two
behaviours), eight items in positive non-intentional magical thinking (two thoughts,
two feelings, two events and two behaviours), eight items in negative intentional
magical thinking (two thoughts, two feelings, two events and two behaviours) and
eight items in negative non-intentional magical thinking (two thoughts, two feelings,
two events and two behaviours). For each item a short scenario involving the same
two protagonists was made up. For example, the scenario for positive intentional
magical thinking towards events was "Jane would like Laura to win some money in
the lottery this week. She thinks about Laura choosing her numbers, paying for the
ticket and taking the ticket home. She imagines Laura in front of the television
watching for her numbers and realising she has won. She wishes that Laura will win
some money". For this item, the question is asked "to what extent will Jane thinking
in this way influence whether Laura wins any money? Rate the degree of influence" .
The subject rates the degree of influence on a 6 point scale from "Not at all" to "Very
much". Similar types of scenario were made up for each aspect ofmagical thinking.
The questionnaire was shown to two other clinicians for suggestions and slight
revisions were made. There was a questionnaire for females naming female
protagonists (Jane and Laura) and a questionnaire for males using male protagonists
(Peter and Mark). This was to assist in the subjects identification with the
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protagonists. The male and female questionnaires differed slightly on two items which
were changed slightly to make them gender appropriate.






magical thinking Feelings Happv, excited
Thoughts Thinking confidently, having pleasant thoughts
Events Getting a promotion, winning the lottery
Behaviour Buying new clothes, moving car
Positive/neutral
non-intentional
magical thinking Feelings Enjoyment, surprise
Thoughts Thinking about a good holiday, remembering about date
Events Having safe flight, finding £10
Behaviour Going out. making phone call
Negative
intentional
magical thinking Feelings Angry, guilty
Thoughts Dislike friend, remembering owes money
Events Tiles blowing off, leak in bathroom
Behaviour Forget bus pass, stav late at work
Negative
non-deliberate
magical thinking Feelings Sad. depressed
Thoughts Remembering bad time, remembering skid
Events Car accident, house burgled
Behaviour Stub toe, get into argument
The Mandsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventoiy- Revised (MOCI-R)
The original Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory was a 30 item true-false
questionnaire (Hodgson and Rachman, 1978). This scale was developed to measure
compulsive behaviours and there are only two items relating to obsessions. Some of
the items have also been criticised for being unclear (Salkovskis, 1990) and it has also
been criticised for fixed true/false responses which do not measure the severity of
symptoms (Tallis, 1995). The revised Maudsley (see Appendix 4) has recently been
developed to address these criticisms and this self-report measure consists of 62 items
assessing obsessive and compulsive symptoms. The patient has to rate each statement
on how much it is true of them on a six point scale ranging from "Not at all" to "Very
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much". An example of a statement is " I am often upset by unwanted urges to harm
myself'. The questionnaire breaks down into six subscales. These subscales are
contamination (11 items), checking (7 items), obsessions (13 items), hoarding (4
items), indecisiveness/perfection/concern over mistakes (8 items) and
routine/counting/slow (9 items). There are also two additional subscales which are
not included in the overall score: TAF-Moral (6 items) and TAF-Likelihood (4
items). The internal reliability has been shown to be good (Thordarson et al., 1997).
The Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAF)
This is a relatively recently developed scale for assessing a concept termed Thought-
Action Fusion thought to be important in obsessive-compulsive disorder (see
Appendix 5). This is the belief that thinking something is as bad as carrying it out or
that by thinking about an event, the risk of the event happening can be increased.
This measure consists of 19 items categorised into two main factors. Each item is a
statement about which the subject rates their agreement or disagreement on a five
point scale. Seven questions assess the Likelihood factor. This factor consists of
negative events happening to a friend/relative (e.g. "If I think of a friend losing their
job, this increases the risk that they will lose their job") and negative events happening
to oneself (e.g. "If I think ofmyself being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that I
will have a fall and be injured"). Twelve questions assess the second factor which is
Thought-Action Fusion in terms ofmorality (e.g. "Thinking ofmaking an extremely
critical remark is almost as unacceptable to me as actually doing it"). Internal
consistency of the Moral and Likelihood subscales has to be found to be good and
these two factors accounted for a large proportion of the total variance (Shafran,
Thordarson and Rachman, 1996).
The Beck Anxiety Inventory(BAI)
This self-report questionnaire consists of 21 items designed to measure the severity of
anxiety in psychiatric patients (Beck and Steer, 1990). The patient rates each item on
a four point scale from "Not at all" to "Severely". The possible score can range from
0-63. The Beck Anxiety Inventory has been found to be correlated with other
measures of anxiety and to have satisfactory levels of test-retest and internal
reliability (Beck, Epstein, Brown and Steer, 1988a, Beck and Steer, 1991).
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The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
This 21 item self- report scale has been very widely used to measure the severity of
depression. For each item, the patient has to circle one of four statements which best
describes the way they have been feeling during the last week. The Beck Depression
Inventory has been shown to have good internal and test-retest reliability (split-half
reliability of .93) and correlates well with other measures of depression (Beck, Steer
and Garbin, 1988b).
SCID-P (W/PSYSCREEN, Version 1.0)
This instrument involved asking specifically about various symptoms of obsessive
compulsive disorder. Questions are asked specifically about obsessions and the
person's reactions to them and about compulsions and the person's reactions to them.
Subjects have to experience either obsessions or compulsions. These obsessions
and/or compulsions have to "cause marked distress, are time-consuming (take more
than an hour a day) or significantly interfere with the person's normal routine,
occupational functioning or usual social activities or relationships with others". The
various criteria can be rated as absent or false, subthreshold or threshold or true. The
interview is designed to assess DSM-III-R criteria for OCD. However, a comparison
between DSM-III-R and DSM-IV criteria for OCD shows that the criteria are very
similar except that in DSM-IV poor insight has to be noted. Particular types of
obsessions were also assessed. These were categorised as contamination, repeated
doubts, need to have things in a particular order, sexual imagery, aggressive or
horrific impulses and other. Types of compulsions were evaluated. These were
categorised as either overt compulsions (checking, washing/cleaning, repeating
actions, requesting/demanding assurances and other) and /or covert compulsions
(praying, counting, repeating words silently and other). The researcher rated whether
any of these obsessions or compulsions was present or absent.
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Timed task
At the end of the clinical interview, the subjects were asked two questions. The first
question was "Can you remember an incident when you thought something bad would
happen and then it actually happened?". The second question was "Can you
remember an incident when you thought something good would happen and then it
actually happened?". Their answer was noted and their speed of response measured.
RESULTS
The results will be presented descriptively as the numbers in each group are too small
to analyse statistically. Out of the six subjects with OCD, all experienced obsessions
(four experienced thoughts about contamination, two experienced repeated doubts,
three experienced the need to keep things in a particular order, one subject
experienced sexual imagery, two experienced aggressive or horrific impulses and one
subject experienced other), all experienced overt compulsions (five carried out
checking behaviour, three subjects carried out washing/cleaning and two repeated
actions) and three experienced covert compulsions (two subjects counted silently and
one subject experienced another type of covert compulsion).
The results of the Magical Thinking measure are shown in Table 2. Only one person
in each group scored at all on the measure, and even these subjects were rating the
degree of influence as a little. The means and standard deviations of the MOCI-R,
BDI, BAI and TAF are presented in Table 3. No subject with OCD could remember
an incident when they had thought about something bad/good and then it happened.
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Table 2. Scores on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire
Variable OCD group (n = 1) Control Group (n = 1)











Table 3. Psychometric data
OCD group (n = 6) Control group (n = 6)
Variable M SD M SD
MOCI-R 73.50 30.50 8.83 6.37
BDI 18.83 5.71 5.50 3.08
BAI 22.67 11.08 2.50 0.84
TAF 26.83 18.57 17.50 9.81
DISCUSSION
These results show that either the Magical Thinking Questionnaire as it stands is
failing to tap the belief in the power of thoughts to affect another person or events, or
alternatively this belief is relatively rare in OCD. Results from previous studies
(Shafran et al., 1996) have shown that the belief in the power of thoughts to affect
events is generally higher in an OCD sample than a student and community group
control samples. However, the authors also noted that the majority of the OCD group
did not rate the belief in the power of thoughts over events highly. They also noted
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that many in the OCD group rated only one item highly. For example, they may agree
strongly with the statement "If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, this
increases the risk that they will lose their job", but not the statement "If I think of a
relative/friend being in a fall, this increases the risk that he/she will be in a fall". The
OCD group in this pilot study are small in numbers and also do not appear to differ
much from the control group on the TAF-Likelihood factor.
Another feature of these types ofbelief in OCD is that people often do not seem to
really believe that thoughts can affect events, but are worried about it all the same just
in case. As mentioned in the introduction, authors have noted that the person can
believe yet simultaneously not believe (Goodwin, 1989). A diagnostic feature ofOCD
is that the person sees their thoughts as senseless and inappropriate at least initially.
Considering the above points, two main changes were made to the Magical Thinking
measure. Firstly, instead of asking the subject to rate the degree of influence, the
question was changed to ask how worried the person would be that having a certain
type of thought might affect another person or another event. Rating the degree of
worry may be a more sensitive measure than rating the degree of influence. Secondly,
the questionnaire was shortened to include only negative outcomes as previous studies
(Shafran et al.,1996) have shown that positive events are least relevant to OCD.
Experiment B
The aim of this study was to assess magical thinking in subjects with OCD and a
matched control group using the revised Magical Thinking Questionnaire. The
hypotheses were as described in the introduction except for two changes. Firstly,
because of the changes in the wording of the questions it was predicted that worry
about thoughts affecting another person or events rather than degree of influence
would be higher in the OCD group. Secondly, because positive items were removed,
the hypothesis looking specifically at the difference between positive and negative
items was no longer relevant and was therefore removed.
46
Subjects
Two groups, an obsessional sample and a 'normal control' sample were used in this
study.
(1)Obsessional sample
Twenty subjects (13 males, 7 females) were recruited from the Clinical Psychology
and Psychiatry departments at the local psychiatric hospitals and community facilities
in Lothian and in Highland region. Again, current in-patients and out-patients,
patients on waiting lists and patients who had previously been seen in the last year
were included. Five of the twenty subjects were recruited from a self-help group.
Three of the subjects were in-patients and twelve were currently or had been out¬
patients within the last year. Three of the twenty subjects had also participated in the
pilot study. Out of fifty one potential subjects contacted, twenty eight refused to
participate or did not reply to an introductory letter about the study. Subjects were
included in this group if their primary clinician thought they had OCD and if they met
DSM-IV criteria for OCD. A short clinical interview was conducted to determine
whether subjects met DSM-IV criteria for Obsessive Compulsive disorder. This was
done using the Obsessive Compulsive disorder section of a structured interview, the
SCID-P (W/PSY SCREEN, Version 1.0), designed to assess psychiatric disorders.
Out of twenty three subjects interviewed, twenty met the diagnostic criteria for
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Of the subjects that were excluded from the study,
one had a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia, one had in the past met the diagnostic
criteria for OCD, but no longer did and one subject had a primary diagnosis of
depression. The mean age of subjects was M= 37.35 years (SD = 9.85) and the
mean years of education was 13.8 years (SD = 3.22). Seventeen subjects were
currently receiving either psychological and/or pharmacological treatment for OCD.
Fourteen OCD subjects were currently receiving the following medications for OCD:
fluoxetine (n = 5), clomipramine (n = 7) and seroxat (n = 2). Nine subjects were
currently receiving cognitive- behavioural therapy for OCD. All the OCD subjects




Twenty adults (11 males, 9 females) were recruited as a normal control group out of
a pool of thirty five control subjects who completed questionnaires. These subjects
were recruited from a staff group through a local healthcare facility. The mean age
was M = 36.65 years (SD = 10.68) and the mean number of years in education was
M = 15.8 years (SD = 2.46). The obsessional group and control group were
matched for sex, age (within 10 years) and, where possible, for years in education
which was measured by years at school and years in full time higher education. For
education, subjects were matched for Higher Education and/or having three years or
less difference in years in education. As in Experiment A, to screen for possible
psychopathology within the control group, subjects were excluded from the control
group if they had a MOCI-R score of 33 or over and/or a BDI score of 10 or over.
Design
A 2 (Group: OCD, Control) x 4 (Target Response: Thoughts, Feelings, Behaviour,
Events) x 2 (Type ofMagical Thinking: Intentional, Non-intentional) factorial design
was employed. The first factor was measured between subjects whereas the last two
factors were measured within subjects.
Procedure
The procedure was exactly the same as Experiment A except a revised Magical
Thinking Questionnaire was used.
Measures
Magical Thinking Questionnaire (Revised)
The results of the pilot study led to several changes to the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire (see Appendix 6). The scenarios remained unchanged, but the wording
of the question was changed. An example of the original wording was "To what
extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark's house was broken
into? Rate the degree of influence (on a 6 point scale from Not at all to very much".
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This was changed to "Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that
having this thought might affect whether the house was broken into? (on a 6 point
scale from Not worried to Very worried)". This change was made as the researcher
thought that this may be a more sensitive measure ofmagical thinking. The positive
items were also removed as these were not compatible with the new type of question
and therefore the new questionnaire contained 16 items. A recent study has also
found that positive items are least relevant to OCD (Shaffan et al., 1996). The
reliability of the questionnaire will be discussed in the Results section.






magical thinking Feelings Angry, guilty
Thoughts Dislike friend, remembering owes money
Events Tiles blowing off, leak in bathroom
Behaviour Forget bus pass, stay late at work
Negative
non-intentional
magical thinking Feelings Sad, depressed
Thoughts Remembering bad time, remembering skid
Events Car accident, house burgled
Behaviour Stub toe, get into argument
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory- Revised (MOCI-R; Thordarson and
Rachman, 1997). See Experiment A
Thought Action Fusion Scale- Revised (TAF; Shafran, Thordarson andRachman,
1996). See Experiment A.
BeckDepression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1961). See Experiment A.
BeckAnxiety Inventory (BAT, Beck and Steer, 1990). See Experiment A.
SCID-P (W/PSYSCREEN, Version 1.0). See Experiment A
Timed task. See Experiment A.
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RESULTS
Description of OCD subjects
Out of the twenty subjects with OCD, all experienced obsessions. Each OCD subject
reported the following number of obsessions out of six possible categories
(contamination, repeated doubts, need to have things in a particular order, sexual
imagery, aggressive impulses, other): one (n = 4), two (n = 8), three (n = 6), four (n = 1)
and five (n = 1). All subjects also experienced compulsions and each OCD subject
reported the following number of compulsions out of nine possible categories: one (n =
2), two (n = 3), three (n = 4), four (n = 7), five (n = 2) and seven (n = 2). The
compulsions were divided into overt compulsions (washing/cleaning, checking, requesting
reassurance, repeating actions, other) and covert compulsions (praying, repeating words
silently, counting, other). Five subjects reported only overt compulsions, one reported
only covert compulsions and fourteen subjects reported overt and covert compulsions.
The following obsessions were reported by OCD subjects in order from the most
frequently reported to the least frequently reported: repeated doubts (n = 17), need to
have things in a particular order (n = 9), contamination (n = 8), aggressive impulses (n =
6), sexual imagery (n = 5) and other (n = 2). OCD subjects also described the following
compulsions: checking (n = 15), requesting reassurance (n = 13), repeating actions (n =
11), counting (n = 8), washing/cleaning (n = 7), repeating words silently (n = 7), praying
(n = 6) and other (n = 5).
Comparisons of demographic variables between groups
In order to assess the effectiveness of the matching of the groups, the differences between
the control group and the experimental group were compared for sex, age and years in
education. No significant differences were found for age (t = .22, 38df, p = .831) and
sex (chi square = .519, ldf, ns). However, the control group had significantly more years
in education than the OCD group(t = -2.21, 38df, p < .05). To ensure that education did
not account for any results, a correlation was conducted looking at the relationship
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between the main measure, the Magical Thinking Questionnaire and years in education.
This correlation was not significant ( r = -.0579, p = .723).
Psychometric data
Means and standard deviations for OCD and control subjects on the MOCI-R, MOCI-R
subscales and BDI, and for OCD subjects only on the BAI and TAF are presented in
Table 5. Before addressing the main hypotheses of the present study, the differences
between groups on the measures of obsessionality and compulsivity and on the depression
scale are presented. The standard deviations differed significantly between the OCD
group and the control group on the MOCI-R, the MOCI-R subscales and the BDI (all F's
greater than 11.25, p < .01), therefore independent sample two-tailed t-tests adjusted for
unequal variance were conducted looking at the differences between the OCD group and
the control group on these measures. OCD subjects scored significantly higher than
controls on the MOCI-R, all MOCI-R subscales and the BDI (see Table 5). The mean
difference between the groups and the 95% confidence interval of the difference between
the means are presented in Table 6.
Magical Thinking Questionnaire
The internal reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) of the whole questionnaire for the
OCD group was .92. For intentional items, the reliability coefficient was .88 and for non-
intentional items, .91. The reliability coefficient of the whole questionnaire for both
groups was .95. Means and standard deviations for the OCD subjects and controls on the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire (total score), on types of magical thinking (intentional
and non-intentional) and on different target responses (thoughts, events, feelings and
behaviour) are included in Table 7. Generally, the OCD group scored higher than the
control group on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire, on both types ofmagical thinking
and on all different target responses. The mean and standard deviation on the Magical
Thinking Questionnaire for the OCD group was 15.10 (SD =13.4) and the mean and
standard deviation for the control group was 2.9 (SD = 8.03) (see Table 7). The lower
Table 5. Psychometric data
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OCD group (n =20) Control group (n =20)
Variable M SD M SD t
MOCI-R 81.45 32.60 9.20 7.47 9.66
MOCI-R Contamination 9.40 9.49 1.25 2.07 3.75
MOCI-R Checking 16.55 9.44 0.70 1.13 7.46
MOCI-R Obsessions 16.50 11.40 1.00 1.26 6.04
MOCI-R Hoarding 5.10 5.24 1.45 1.99 2.91
MOCI-R Indecisiveness 18.05 9.14 3.40 2.52 6.91'
MOCI-R Routine 15.95 9.93 1.25 1.89 6.50'
MOCI-R TAF-Moral 8.20 6.25 2.45 3.15 3.68'
MOCI-R TAF-Likelihood 3.25 4.05 0.30 0.66 3.21'
BDI 20.40 11.21 2.35 2.23 7.06'
BAI 21.65 13.96 - - -
TAF Total 28.55 17.73 - - -
TAF-Moral 20.85 12.33 - - -
TAF-Likelihood 7.70 8.28 - - -
*
p < 0.01
Table 6. Mean difference and 95% confidence interval of difference
Variable Mean difference 957o confidence interval of diff
MOCI-R 72.25 56.69, 87.70
MOCI-R Contamination 8.15 3.63, 12.67
MOCI-R Checking 15.85 11.41, 20.29
MOCI-R Obsessions 15.50 10.14, 20.86
MOCI-R Hoarding 3.65 1.07, 6.23
MOCI-R Indecisiveness 14.65 10.25, 19.05
MOCI-R Routine 14.70 9.99, 19.41
MOCI-R TAF-Moral 5.75 2.55, 8.95
MOCI-R TAF-Likelihood 2.95 1.04, 4.86
BDI 18.05 12.73, 23.37
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Table 7. Mean scores and standard deviations for Magical Thinking Questionnare
OCD group (n=20) Control group (n=20)
Variable M SD M SD
MTQ Total 15.10 13.40 2.90 8.03
Magical Thinking type
Intentional 5.65 5.69 1.05 3.63
Non-intentional 9.45 9.20 1.95 4.51
Target response
Thoughts 3.50 3.86 0.95 3.03
Events 4.90 4.25 1.10 1.71
Feelings 3.55 4.21 0.55 1.88
Behaviour 3.20 3.11 0.45 1.61
Key. MTQ = Magical Thinking Questionnaire
and upper 95 % confidence intervals for the mean score on the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire for the OCD group were 8.83 to 21.37. The lower and upper 95%
confidence intervals for the control group were 0.86 to 6.66. The standard deviations of
the data were high for both groups reflecting the wide variability in scores on this
questionnaire. The range of scores for the OCD group was from 0 to 36 and the range of
scores for the control group was 0 to 34.
Figure 1 presents the percentage of subjects who scored one or above on the Magical
Thinking Questionnaire by group, influence type (intentional/non-intentional) and target
response. The results show that a greater percentage of subjects in the OCD than the
control group scored one or above on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire. Out of the
twenty subjects with OCD, fifteen scored one or more on the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire and five scored zero suggesting that not all people with OCD are worried
about their thoughts affecting other people or events. Out of the control group, ten
scored zero on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire and ten scored one or above. When




MTQ Inten Non-inten Thou Even Feel Behav
Figure 1. Percentages of subjects scoring one or above on Magical Thinking
Questionnaire (MTQ) by group, magical thinking type (intentional/non-intentional) and by
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Figure 2. Distribution of scores on Magical Thinking Questionnaire by group
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about the effect of non-intentional thoughts as compared to intentional thoughts, although
again a higher percentage ofOCD subjects are worried about both types of thought.
Looking at target response, a greater percentage ofboth groups are worried about
thoughts influencing events as compared to thoughts influencing thoughts, behaviours or
feelings. Figure 2 presents the distribution of scores on the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire by group. This shows the majority of control subjects scored between 0
and 3 with only two control subjects scoring much higher. A significant minority ofOCD
subjects also scored between 0 and 3, but the distribution of scores for the OCD group
seems to be more varied.
To investigate the main hypothesis that scores on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire
would be higher in the OCD group than the control group, a Mann-Whitney Test (two-
tailed) was conducted to investigate whether the total score on the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire differed between the groups, fn all analyses involving the control group,
non-parametric tests were chosen because in the control group, a large number of
subjects scored zero and therefore the data were significantly skewed. A significant
difference was found between the groups, with the OCD group scoring significantly
higher on worry about magical thinking than the control group (U = 91.5, p < .01). The
mean rank for the OCD group was 25 .92 and the mean rank for the control group was
15.07.
The next hypothesis was that worry would be higher about non-intentional thoughts
compared to intentional thoughts in the OCD group, but not the control group. Initially,
it was envisaged a 2 (group: OCD, control) x 2 (Magical Thinking type: intentional, non-
intentional) analysis of variance (ANOVA) would be conducted with repeated measures
on the second factor, but because of the need for non-parametric tests with the control
group, analyses were conducted separately within groups. In order to test out the second
hypothesis, a t-test for paired samples (two-tailed) was conducted comparing scores on
intentional versus non-intentional items on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire within the
OCD group. This analysis showed that OCD subjects worried significantly more about
the effect of non-intentional than intentional thoughts (t = -2.30, 19df, p < .05). The
mean difference between the conditions and the 95% confidence interval of the mean
difference was 3.8 (.34, 7.26). An equivalent non-parametric test was also carried out
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within the OCD group and again revealed that OCD subjects scored significantly higher
on non-intentional compared to intentional items. To test whether worry would be higher
for non-intentional items within the control group, a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks test was conducted. As predicted, no significant difference was found between
worry about intentional compared to non-intentional thoughts (Z = -.9297, p = .3525).
Thirdly, it was hypothesised that worry would be higher depending upon the target
responses. Specifically, it was hypothesised that worry about thoughts affecting events
and behaviour would be higher than worry about thoughts affecting other's thoughts and
feelings. In order to test this hypothesis, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
within the OCD group. No significant difference was found for type of target response
within the OCD group ( F = 2.23, p = .094). There were also no significant differences
within the OCD group using an equivalent non-parametric test. To investigate this
hypothesis in the control group, a Friedman Analysis of Variance by ranks was
conducted, which again showed no significant difference for target response (chi square =
5.295, 3df, ns). When inspecting the means for each target response, the trend for both
groups was that subjects scored higher on items looking at worry about events (see Table
7).
Intercorrelations between research variables
The fourth hypothesis predicted that scores on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire would
correlate significantly with the Likelihood factor of the Thought Action Fusion Scale and
the MOCI-R. When looking at the OCD group only, Pearson's correlation coefficients
(two tailed) were calculated and when looking at the control group, Spearman's
correlation coefficients (two tailed) were calculated.
Correlations betweenMTQ andMOCI-R
There was no significant correlation between the total score of the MOCI-R and total
score of the Magical Thinking Questionnaire in the OCD group (see Table 8). When
looking at specific subscales, the only MOCI-R subscale which correlated with the total



































































































































































score on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire was the Obsessions subscale (r =.4765,
p< 05). All other subscales, including the Checking subscale, correlated non-significantly
with the Magical Thinking Questionnaire. In the OCD group, the BDI and the BAI did
not correlate significantly with the Magical Thinking Questionnaire therefore depression
was not partialled out in the correlations.
In the control group, the total score on the MOCI-R also did not correlate significantly
with the total score on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire (see Table 9). When looking
at specific subscales the Magical Thinking Questionnaire correlated significantly with the
Contamination subscale and the TAF-Likelihood and the TAF-Moral additional subscales
of the MOCI-R. The BDI did not correlate significantly with the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire in the control group.
When looking at correlations between subsections of the Magical Thinking Questionnaire
and the overall MOCI-R score within the OCD group (see Table 8), only the items
involving the target response Feelings correlated significantly with the MOCI-R (r = .449,
p < .05). Other subsections of the Magical Thinking Questionnaire correlated
significantly with subscales of the MOCI-R. For example, the Feelings items and
Thoughts items correlated significantly with the Obsessions subscale and the Events items
correlated with the Contamination subscale. The Magical Thinking Questionnaire
intentional items correlated significantly with the Obsessions subscale.
When looking at individual sections of the Magical Thinking Questionnaire in the control
group, the Thoughts items and the Feelings items both correlated significantly with the
overall score on the MOCI-R in the control group (see Table 9). The intentional items,
but not the non-intentional items also correlated significantly with the MOCI-R. Other
subscales of the MOCI-R also correlated significantly with subsections of the Magical
Thinking Questionnaire. For example, the Feelings, Behaviour and Thoughts items
correlated significantly with the Hoarding, Obsessions and Routine subscales as well as
with both additional subscales of the MOCI-R. The non-intentional items did not
correlate significantly with any of the main MOCI-R subscales.
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Table 9. Correlations between the MOCI-R, MOCI-R subscales, the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire and BDI in control group
MTQ Inten Non-inte Thought Feeling Event Behav BDI
MOCI-R 0.15 0.55* 0.04 0.51* 0.51* 0.03 0.51* 0.21
MOCI-R Contamination 0.44* 0.38 0.22 0.2 0.2 0.33 0.2 0.29
MOCI-R Checking 0.14 0.46* 0.09 0.4 0.4 0.06 0.4 0.2
MOCI-R Obsessions 0.37 0.46* 0.22 0.46* 0.46* 0.25 0.46* 0.01
MOCI-R Hoarding 0.01 0.5* -0.04 0.55* 0.55* -0.1 0.55* -0.16
MOCI-R Indecisiveness 0.03 0.43 0.07 0.4 0.4 0.05 0.4 0.39
MOCI-R Routine 0.28 0.47* 0.22 0.47* 0.47* 0.17 0.47* 0.02
MOCI-R TAF Moral 0.5* 0.55* 0.35 0.5* 0.5* 0.35 0.5* 0.13
MOCI-R TAF Likelihood 0.51* 0.86* 0.68* 0.66* 0.66* 0.72* 0.66* 0.27
BDI 0.12 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.32 -0.12 -
*
p < .05
Table 10. Correlations between target responses and correlations between non-intentional
and intentional items on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire in the OCD group
MTQ Target reponses Magical T linking type
Thought Feelings Events Behaviour Non-intentional Intentional
Behaviour 0.57* 0.72* 0.68* - - -
Events 0.62* 0.56* - 0.68* - -
Feelings 0.87* - 0.56* 0.72* - -
Thoughts - 0.87* 0.62* 0.57* - -




Correlations betweenMTO and TAF
As hypothesised, the total score on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire correlated
significantly with the overall score on the TAF Scale and the Likelihood factor of the
TAF scale within the OCD group. The Likelihood factor can be broken down into items
looking at self and others. Both these groups of items correlated significantly with the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire. Correlations were relatively high between the Magical
Thinking Questionnaire and the Thought Action Fusion measures, especially the
Likelihood factor.
Correlations between TAF andMOC1-R
When investigating the association between the TAF and the MOC1-R within the OCD
group (see Table 8), the TAF, like the Magical Thinking Questionnaire, did not correlate
significantly with the MOCI-R. Again, like the Magical Thinking Questionnaire, the only
MOCI-R subscale the TAF correlated significantly with was the Obsessions subscale.
When looking at the individual subscales in TAF (TAF-Likelihood, TAF-Moral), the
correlations with the MOCI-R were also non-significant, but these subscales also
correlated significantly with the Obsessions subscale. The BAI, but not the BDI
correlated significantly with the TAF. The TAF-Likelihood factor and the TAF-Moral
factor correlated significantly.
Correlations withinMagical Thinking Questionnaire
Looking at the Magical Thinking Questionnaire (see Table 10), correlations among
different types ofmagical thinking (intentional and non-intentional) and types of target
response were moderate. The intentional and non-intentional items correlated
significantly. All combinations of target responses correlated significantly.
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Timed task
The results of this task will be presented descriptively as the majority of subjects with
OCD (n = 13) did not remember thinking about a good or bad event which then actually
happened and therefore the numbers are too small for statistical analysis. Seven subjects
remembered either a good or bad event. Out of subjects who did remember such an
event, two subjects remembered only a bad event they thought about which then actually
happened, three subjects remembered only a good event they thought about which
actually happened and two remembered both a good and a bad event. The types of event
remembered by each subject and their Magical Thinking Questionnaire and TAF-
Likelihood score are presented in Table 11.
The mean and standard deviation on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire for subjects who
remembered an event was 21 (8.33) compared to 11.92 (14.77) for subjects who did not
remember an event. The range of scores for subjects who remembered an event was 13
to 34 compared to a range of 0 to 36 for subjects who did not remember an event. The
same pattern was found for mean scores on the TAF-Likelihood items. The mean and
standard deviations for subjects who remembered an event scored 12.14 (10.04)
compared to a mean score of 5.31 (6.36) for subjects who did not remember an event.
The range of scores on TAF-Likelihood for subjects who remembered an event was 2 to
27 compared to 0-16 for subjects who did not remember an event.
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Table 11. Description of event, latency of recall. Magical Thinking Score and TAF-Likelihood score by
subject
Subject
Description of good event
(latency in sees)







At work, had thought about
task which came true (1 sec) None remembered 31 26
2
Thought about relative waking
up from coma which then
happened (4 sees)
Thought about someone being
hurt then dad hurt himself 2
days later ( 1 sec) 13 9
3
Thought that one newborn twin
would live which happened (15
sees)
Thought about someone
saying 'ouch' which then
happened (9 sees) 18 2
4
Father was smoking. Thought
about him stopping which he
then did (5 sees) None remembered 34 27
5 None remembered
Thought about friend coming
round to ask about house next
day and they did (12 sees) 21 11
6
Thinking that football team
might win and they did (5 sees) None remembered 14 7
7 None remembered
Thought about boat being
wrecked which then happened
(9 sees) 16 7
The mean and range on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire for those who remembered a
bad event was 17 (13-21) and for subjects who did not remember such an event was
14.63 (0-36). For subjects who recalled a good event, the mean and range on the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire was 22 (13-34) and for subjects who did not remember
such an event, the mean score was 12.80 (0-36). A similar pattern was found for scoring
on the TAF-Likelihood of the TAF. For subjects who remembered a bad event, the mean
and range was 6.25 (2-9) and for those who did not, the mean score was slightly higher
at 8.06 (0-27). For subjects who remembered a good event, the mean on the TAF-
Likelihood was 14.2 (2-27) and for those who did not, the mean was lower at 5.53 (0-
16). The mean response time and standard deviation for recall of bad events was 7.75
(4.72) and the mean response for recall of good events was slightly lower at 6.00 (5.29).
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Factor Analysis
While it was accepted that the number of subjects was low to carry out a factor analysis,
a recent study by Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) suggested that components with four or
more loadings above .60 in absolute value are reliable regardless of sample size.
Therefore a principal components analysis with a Varimax rotation was performed on the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire, each of the MOCI-R subscales, the BAI and the BDI.
Four factors emerged accounting for 78 .8% of the variance. The first factor included the
variables Obsessions, TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood and the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire which all had loadings over .60 suggesting this is a reliable finding. The
second factor had three variables which loaded over .80 (Indecisiveness, Routine,
Checking) again suggesting this is reliable. The third and fourth factors each only had
two factors over .60 making the reliability of these components questionable.
DISCUSSION
Introduction
The results indicated that the Magical Thinking Questionnaire is a reliable measure in an
OCD and adult control group. There was good internal consistency within the measure
with relatively high reliability coefficients of the whole questionnaire, intentional items
and non-intentional items. The validity of the measure was investigated by looking at the
relationship between the Magical Thinking Questionnaire and the TAF scale. The Magical
Thinking Questionnaire correlated highly with the TAF Scale and the TAF Likelihood
subscale indicating concurrent validity with this measure. TAF has been shown to be a
very reliable construct in obsessional, adult and student groups (Shafran et al., 1996).
Within the questionnaire, individual sections correlated moderately with each other. This
might suggest that all items are tapping one underlying factor. Subject numbers were not
large enough to conduct a factor analysis of the questionnaire items.
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The purpose of the present study was to determine whether magical thinking (as
measured by level ofworry about thoughts affecting other people or events) was more
prevalent in a group of subjects with OCD compared to a normal control group. The
results of the study indicated that the level ofworry was significantly higher in the
subjects with OCD thus confirming the main hypothesis. However in Experiment A, a
pilot study of twelve subjects (six OCD subjects, six control subjects) which asked
subjects to rate the degree of influence actually thinking about something would have,
most subjects did not score at all. The difference between the two measures and the
possible reasons for it will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
The other hypotheses of the study were focused on which particular types ofmagical
thinking might be more frequent in the OCD group. The second hypothesis was that
the OCD subjects would rate their worry as higher about non-intentional thoughts as
opposed to intentional thoughts. Intentional thoughts are when a person is
deliberately wishing for something to happen, whereas non-intentional thoughts are
thoughts that "pop" into the mind involuntarily. When looking at the OCD group,
subjects scored significantly higher on the items tapping non-intentional magical
thinking than items tapping intentional magical thinking. When looking at the control
group, no significant difference was found between their scores on non-intentional
items than intentional items. These results indicate that OCD subjects do worry more
about the effect of their non-intentional thoughts on others than the effect of their
intentional thoughts, whereas the control subjects do not seem to worry more about
the effects of their non-intentional thoughts than their intentional thoughts.
The third hypothesis was that OCD subjects would rate their worry as higher on items
looking at the effect of their thoughts on events or others behaviour as compared to
others' thoughts or feelings. This hypothesis was not confirmed. No significant
differences were found between scoring on groups of items looking at thoughts,
feelings, events or behaviour. When looking at the means, both groups scored more
highly on items relating to events. This result might have been significant if there had
been more subjects in each group and the power of the study had been higher. The
issue of power will be discussed in a later section.
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The fourth hypothesis predicted that the Magical Thinking Questionnaire would
correlate significantly with the MOCI-R, especially the Checking subscale. This
hypothesis was not confirmed. The Magical Thinking Questionnaire did not correlate
significantly with the MOCI-R or the Checking subscale. The final hypothesis was
that subjects who remembered an event which they had thought about and then
actually happened would score more highly on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire.
Seven subjects did remember such an event, and these seven subjects did tend to score
more highly the thirteen subjects who did not, but a statistical comparison was not
possible due to small group sizes. The next part of the discussion will cover between
group differences and the nature ofmagical thinking in the OCD and control groups.
The aetiology ofmagical thinking, the methodology of the study and finally,
implications for therapy will then be discussed.
Between group differences in magical thinking
The implications of the confirmation of the first hypothesis, that the OCD group
scored higher on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire, will be firstly be discussed.
Initially, it is important to note that worry about overextended personal influence is
not universal among subjects with OCD. While overall there were significant group
differences on the revised Magical Thinking Questionnaire, not all subjects in the
OCD group actually did worry about their thoughts affecting another person. In
Experiment B five subjects (25%) of the OCD group did not score on the revised
Magical Thinking Questionnaire and there was a wide variety in the range of scores
within the OCD sample. This result, together with the results of the pilot study,
shows that the belief or worry about the influence of thoughts is not present in all
subjects with OCD and is present to a much greater degree in some subjects, but that
worry about thoughts affecting events or others is generally more prevalent in an
OCD group compared to a normal control group. This finding fits in with results
from previous research which has also suggested that this belief is only present in a
subsection of people with OCD (Kulhara and Prasad Rao, 1985; Khanna and
Channabasavanna, 1988; Shafran et al., 1996).
The results also indicated that the OCD group rated their worry as higher about non-
intentional thoughts than intentional thoughts whereas no difference was found
between ratings ofworry about non-intentional thoughts compared to intentional
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thoughts in the control group. One explanation for these findings is that the control
group may not have scored high enough on the questionnaire to reliably test out the
difference between these types ofmagical thinking. Evidence supporting this
explanation is that in the control group the mean of non-intentional items was higher
than the mean on intentional items. In addition, fifty percent of subjects scored one or
over on non-intentional items whereas only fifteen percent scored one or over on non-
intentional items. In order to test out this possibility, a larger control group would
have to be used. An alternative interpretation is that the results demonstrate a genuine
difference in magical thinking between the two groups. This difference could be
explained by differences in beliefs about thoughts between the OCD and control
group. Studies (Rachman and de Silva, 1978) have shown that most people
occasionally experience intrusive thoughts similar in content to people with OCD.
Intrusive thoughts can be likened to the non-intentional thoughts as described in the
questionnaire and are a main characteristic ofOCD. They appear out of the blue and
are experienced as senseless and unwanted. Magical thinking has been hypothesised
to be strengthened by a person carrying out a ritual in response to a distressing
thought (Freud, 1909) because this is apparently effective in preventing the harmful
outcome. Over time, the beliefmay become more strongly held and therefore the
person experiences increased worry and the increased urge to carry out a ritual every
time another intrusive thought is experienced. If subjects were deliberately wishing
for something to happen, this would be unlikely to make them worried. They would
not carry out a ritual and therefore beliefs about the possible influence of intentional
thoughts are not increased. This may explain the difference in the levels ofworry
about the possible influence of intentional and non-intentional thoughts in the OCD
group. However against this hypothesis, in the present study, some subjects with
OCD were also worried about the possible influence of intentional thoughts and non-
intentional and intentional items were moderately correlated. The nature ofbeliefs in
OCD will be discussed further in a later section.
The third hypothesis about the Magical Thinking Questionnaire was that worry would
be higher about thoughts affecting events or behaviours than thoughts or feelings in
both the OCD and the normal control group. This hypothesis was not confirmed as
there was no statistically significant differences between the four target responses in
either group. When inspecting the means of each target response in both groups, the
mean for events items were higher than the means for items related to thoughts,
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feelings or behaviours. When looking at percentage of subjects who scored on each
set of items in the control group, fifty percent scored at least once on an event item
while only ten percent scored on any of the other items. This difference was not so
apparent in the OCD group. Seventy-five percent of subjects scored on items relating
to the target response events, fifty-five percent on the thoughts items, fifty percent on
the feeling items and seventy percent on the behaviour items. This suggests that in
the OCD group as well as scoring higher in the questionnaire generally, the OCD
group rate worry about their thoughts affecting a wider range of target responses.
Previously, it has been thought that OCD subjects worry about their thoughts
increasing the risk of negative events happening to other people. The present study
suggests that they also worry about their thoughts affecting another person's thoughts,
feelings and behaviour as well as negative events happening to another person. The
nature ofmagical thinking in the OCD group will be discussed further in the next
section. This includes the measurement ofmagical thinking, the heterogeneity of
OCD , the relationship ofmagical thinking to specific OCD symptoms and the
relationship of a belief or worry about magical thinking to other belief domains in
OCD.
The nature of magical thinking in OCD group
Measuring worry versus belief
In exploring the nature ofmagical thinking in OCD, a relevant area to consider is why
there were very low scores on the first questionnaire used in the pilot study compared
to higher scores on the second revised Magical Thinking Questionnaire. Several
possible explanations could account for the difference in the results on the two
measures. Firstly, the differences in scoring between the original questionnaire and
the new questionnaire may be accounted for by the different samples used in each
experiment. In Experiment A, only six subjects with OCD were used. Ifmore
subjects had been recruited to complete this questionnaire, it may have been the case
that some subjects scored on it. Even in Experiment B, five subjects with OCD did
not score at all on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire. Against this explanation ,
there were three subjects who completed both questionnaires and when comparing
their results on the two questionnaires, this showed that subjects with OCD did tend
to score more highly on the second questionnaire tapping worry as opposed to belief.
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One subject scored zero on the original questionnaire and four on the new
questionnaire, another scored four on the old questionnaire and seventeen on the new
questionnaire. The third subject scored zero on both.
A second explanation is that the revised questionnaire asked people specifically about
how much the subject would worry about the effect of their own thoughts rather than
only asking about the effect of another person's thoughts. The difference in scoring
on the two questionnaires may suggest that people do not have a general belief in
magical thinking for other people, but do hold that belief about their own thoughts.
This argument may be backed up by clinical descriptions. It is rare for someone with
OCD to be worried about another person influencing them by their thoughts. This is a
more common feature of psychotic disorders, such as schizophrenia.
A third interpretation of the difference between the two questionnaires may be that
measuring worry about the overimportance of thoughts is a more sensitive measure
than measuring the actual belief in extended personal influence. This finding may be
explained by the nature ofbeliefs in OCD. People often know their behaviour or
thoughts are senseless or irrational and OCD is mainly characterised from psychotic
disorders by the weaker strength in beliefs and the realisation at least initially that it is
probably untrue. The fact that worry seemed to be a more sensitive measure than
measuring the degree of influence suggests that the beliefs in personal extended
influence are not necessarily strongly held. This ties in with low tolerance of
ambiguity as the person may find it difficult to tolerate the vague possibility that their
thoughts increase the risk of harm occurring to another person. In response, they
attempt to control the effect of their thoughts, for example, by carrying out an covert
or overt action to reduce the vague risk that something might happen. Generally,
nothing bad does happen and this may increase the probability that the next time a
person experiences an intrusive thought about harm happening to another person, that
they experience anxiety and carry out an action. This also means that the belief in
personal extended influence is never discontinued because the person attributes the
fact that nothing bad did happen to the preventative action they took. This also may
explain the difference between the levels of responsibility and level of overextended
personal influence often expressed for bad, but not for good events in individuals with
OCD. If the person does not really believe that thoughts affect another person or
events, but cannot cope with the vague possibility this leads to worry and the urge to
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neutralise and carry out some compulsive behaviour. Logically, the subject would not
worry about the vague possibility of being responsible for something good therefore
does not have the urge to carry out an action to reduce the risk of a good event
happening. This means the above cycle is not started and the belief about thoughts
affecting the outcome ofpositive events is not reinforced and strengthened.
The Magical Thinking Questionnaire and the TAF scale measures differ in that the
TAF Likelihood-for-others factor scale measures belief in thoughts affecting events
rather than worry about thoughts affecting events. On the TAF Scale, subjects have
to rate their level of agreement (agree strongly, agree, neither agree or disagree,
disagree or disagree strongly) with a statement such as "If I think of a relative/friend
being in a car accident, this increases the risk that they will be in a car accident." The
two scales do correlate highly, but when investigating how people score on the TAF-
Likelihood-for-others items compared to the Magical Thinking Questionnaire,
differences in results can be seen between the two measures for some subjects. For
example, five subjects did not agree with any items on TAF-Likelihood-for-others yet
on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire rated on some items that they would be quite
worried, worried or very worried about thoughts affecting another person or events.
(One of these subjects disagreed strongly with all items on the TAF-Likelihood-for-
others, two subjects disagreed with all the statements and one neither agreed or
disagreed with the statements). Seven subjects did not agree with any statement on
the TAF Likelihood-for-others items (most subjects disagreed or disagreed strongly
with all statements) yet rated they would be very slightly worried or slightly worried
about some items on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire. Two subjects agreed
strongly with statements on the TAF and also scored highly on worry on the Magical
Thinking Questionnaire. One subject agreed with two items on the TAF-Likelihood
items and rated their worry as only very slight on items on the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire. Five subjects scored zero on both questionnaires. Comparing the two
questionnaires shows that some subjects show no evidence of a belief in thoughts
affecting events on the TAF Scale yet rate on another questionnaire that they would
be worried (even if only slightly in some cases) about thoughts affecting another
person or events.
In summary, differences in results between Experiment A and B and comparisons of
the TAF and the MTQ indicates that worry may be a more sensitive measure of
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magical thinking than measuring the degree of belief in some subjects. Low tolerance
of ambiguity could be one explanation ofwhy people worry about their thoughts
causing harm to another person. Priming has also been suggested to be important
when assessing appraisals, e.g. "When you feel anxious, what types of thoughts do
you have..?". People with anxiety disorders have been shown to have threat related
beliefs which are only accessed in situations they perceive as dangerous (Beck and
Emery, 1985). The same may be true of people with OCD. Thoughts about personal
extended influence may be only accessed in relevant situations when the person feels
anxious. In the present questionnaire another way of tapping magical thinking could
have been to word the questions as "When you are worried, how much do you believe
that your thoughts could affect....?"
Individual variations in magical thinking
As well as the finding that there was great variation on scores on the Magical
Thinking Questionnaire within the OCD group, there also seemed to be individual
variations in beliefs about personal extended influence which this questionnaire did not
tap although subjects reported them qualitatively. One subject did not score on the
questionnaire. She described that she did not believe that thoughts could affect events
or another person, but she also described that if she said a thought out loud, she
would worry that saying out loud would increase the risk of it happening. Another
subject who had a relatively low score on the questionnaire believed that thoughts or
mental events could affect real life events, but he did not believe that thinking about a
car crash could affect whether a car crash occurred. Instead, he believed that the
completion of a counting sequence could increase the probability of a negative event
occurring. When the sequence got to a certain number, he had an intense visual image
of something harmful happening to a relative or friend. However, he believed it was
the counting sequence and reaching a certain number which influenced whether a
negative event happened. This may reflect the often idiosyncratic nature of beliefs in
OCD and gives support for the need for a more individually based approach to the
measurement of beliefs in OCD as advocated by Rheaume, Ladoceur, Freeston and
Letarte (1995). Safran et al. (1990) also commented that as the nature of these beliefs
become clearer and more detailed research into the cognitive features of a disorder is
conducted, it can be useful to take a more individually focused approach which can
make specific predictions about an individual's schemas and the associated processing
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biases. They emphasised the importance of having specific hypotheses about the
cognitive events, processes and structures which are present in particular disorders. It
could be hypothesised that worry would be rated as even higher in the present study
if scenarios relevant to an individual person were chosen as demonstrated in the study
by Rachman, Shaffan, Trant and Teachman (1997) using a non-clinical population.
These findings fit in with the heterogeneity of the presentation ofOCD which has
been noted by many authors (Tallis, 1995; Steketee, 1993). For example, Shafran et
al. (1996) found that many subjects with OCD only rated one item strongly out of all
the TAF-Likelihood-for-others items. Therefore a subject may be very worried about
the effect of thinking about their friend/relative being in a car crash, but not at all
worried about thinking about them falling ill. In the present study, subjects showed
this same variability in their worry and the particular scenarios that they were most
worried about seemed to vary between subjects. When looking at the mean scores for
each item, the highest rated items were worrying about thoughts influencing whether
someone would be in car crash, whether someone's house would be burgled, whether
someone would remember cruel remarks and whether someone would feel sad. These
were all non-intentional items and included three target responses of thoughts, feelings
and events. The lowest rated items were worrying about thoughts influencing
whether someone had a leak in their bathroom and whether someone forgot their bus
pass. These are both intentional items and include the target responses of events and
behaviour.
One way of addressing the problem of heterogeneity has been to attempt to develop
reliable measures of the different types ofbeliefs in OCD (Obsessive Compulsive
Cognitions Working Group, 1997) and to try to link particular beliefs and particular
OCD symptoms. Tallis (1994) also described how certain types ofbeliefs may be
associated with certain kinds of symptoms ofOCD, but commented that research
investigating these types of potential relationships was at an early stage. This raises
the question ofwhat particular symptoms or characteristics ofOCD may be associated
with different types ofbelief and whether in fact different beliefs can be reliably linked
to specific OCD symptoms.
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Relationship between MTQ and OCD symptoms
The relationship between beliefs and particular OCD symptoms has been addressed
empirically. For example, excessive responsibility has been linked to compulsive
checking behaviour (Rheaume et al., 1995a; Lopatka and Rachman, 1995) although
other research investigating therapy for OCD indicated that increased responsibility
was not evident in two subjects with checking behaviour (Ladouceur, Leger and
Rheaume, 1994). The belief in overextended personal influence has also been linked to
checking behaviour. For example, research has shown that checking behaviour may
be associated with TAF- Likelihood factor which postulates that thinking about a
negative event increases the risk of it occurring (Shafran et al., 1996). Checking
behaviour has also been found to correlate with measures of superstitious beliefs and
behaviour in a student group (Frost et al., 1993). In the present study, no significant
correlation was found between the either the overall score of the MOCI-R or the
Checking subscale of the MOCI-R and the Magical Thinking Questionnaire or the
Thought Action Fusion Scale in the obsessional sample. This was not as predicted.
The only subscale of the MOCI-R that did correlate significantly with either of these
measures was the Obsessions subscale. This relationship between the Obsessions
subscale and the Magical Thinking Questionnaire was not specifically hypothesised
and would have to be replicated in another study to ensure it was a reliable result.
There are several reasons why the overall score of the MOCI-R might not correlate
significantly with the Magical Thinking Questionnaire. Firstly, this study and others
(Khanna and Chabbasavanna,1988; Shafran et al., 1996) indicate that magical thinking
or a belief in extended personal influence is not a universal belief in OCD and is
present strongly in only a subsection of those with OCD. Therefore many people with
high scores on the MOCI-R may score nothing on the Magical Thinking
Questionnaire. It seems more likely that certain types of symptoms or characteristics
ofOCD are associated with a belief in extended personal influence (Tallis, 1994). In
the present study, there does seem to be a significant correlation in the OCD group
between the Magical Thinking Questionnaire and the Obsessions subscale of the
MOCI-R. A second explanation for the lack of a relationship between the total score
on the MOCI-R and the Magical Thinking Questionnaire is that if a subject has only
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one strong obsession and/or compulsion, they may not score that highly on the overall
score of the MOCI-R, but score highly on one or two subscales.
The relationship ofmagical thinking to other beliefs associated with OCD
While different beliefs may be associated with particular characteristics ofOCD, it is
likely that different beliefs may be associated with one another. Excessive
responsibility has been viewed as the main cognitive belief which may be associated
with OCD (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997) and one
question is how might a belief or worry about magical thinking be associated with
excessive responsibility. The TAF scale emerged from work looking at the construct
of responsibility. Shafran et al. (1996) discussed how a belief in TAF might be viewed
as increasing thoughts of responsibility and trigger anxiety or discomfort. If one
worries that one's thoughts may cause harm to others then one is going to feel very
responsible for trying to control these thoughts or to neutralise the effect of them by
carrying out particular overt or covert rituals. A belief in personal extended influence
and thoughts of responsibility are likely to be closely linked.
Other types ofbeliefs have been investigated in OCD. Beliefs that are held about your
own thoughts have been termed metacognitions and have been investigated by several
researchers (Freeston et al. 1992; Shafran et al.,1996; Clark and Purdon,1993 ).
These include beliefs about the over importance of thoughts and the importance of
controlling one's thoughts. Clark and Purdon (1993) found that perceived control
over thoughts was most strongly predicted by the belief in that the thought might
come true or be acted upon. This finding indicates that beliefs about controlling
thoughts may to some extent be accounted for by beliefs about the possible
consequences of thoughts. This indicates a possible association between a belief or
worry about magical thinking and beliefs in the importance of controlling thoughts.
For example, if one had a belief or worry about thoughts possibly causing harm to
someone, this may increase the belief in the need to control over your thoughts, in
order to prevent the harm from occurring.
Another area that may be relevant is work investigating low tolerance of ambiguity.
Rather than really believing that thoughts may affect other people or events, it may be
the belief in the very small possibility that thoughts may increase the risk of harm and
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the inability to tolerate this uncertainty which triggers anxiety. Tolerance of ambiguity
has been addressed previously in OCD. Rasmussen and Eisen (1990) viewed a need
for certainty as an important feature ofOCD and measures such as the Inventory of
Beliefs as related to Obsessions includes items looking at this construct. For example,
subjects checking light switches again and again have been noted to think it is very
unlikely they left the lights on, but want to check again just in case. Tallis (1995) also
notes that like in other areas ofOCD, poor tolerance of uncertainty can be held only
in particular situations. He gives the example of a man who read his insurance
policies over and over again, never feeling certain that he had understood the text
properly. Poor tolerance ofuncertainty has also been noted in other disorders such as
anxiety and depression and it is unclear how specific this beliefmay be to OCD.
In summary, the possible relationship of different types ofbelief to each other is still
an empirical question. Currently, work is focusing on developing reliable, valid
measures for specific beliefs (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working group,
1997). Once these measures are fully developed, more research may be carried out
how these beliefs are associated.
The nature of magical thinking in control subjects
Results from the normal control group indicated that worry about thoughts does exist
at a low level in a significant number of the group. While halfof the normal sample
scored zero on the questionnaire, half the normal sample did score, one or two quite
highly. This may show that worry about thoughts affecting events or other people are
present in the normal population even though are at a very low level. Other research
has shown that these types ofbelief and worries are present in the normal population.
Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant and Teachman (1997) looked at students who had
scored highly on the TAF-Likelihood factor. They were asked to write down the
phrase "I hope (friend's name inserted ) is in a car accident". This increased anxiety
and the urge to neutralise. The fact that these types of thoughts and worries are
present in the normal population fits in with the cognitive model ofOCD which
proposes that it is the meaning (and the beliefs underlying this process) that a person
ascribes to their thoughts which is important in governing their reaction. If a person
experiences a thought like "my friend will be in a car crash" (which are common in the
normal population), they often feel very slightly worried. The person usually does
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nothing in response to this worry. Nothing happens and the belief is therefore not
reinforced. Whereas as described above, if the person does react to this worry, the
belief can be reinforced and anxiety is increased the next time that thought is
experienced.
Magical thinking has also been found to be related to low tolerance of ambiguity in a
normal population (Keinan, 1994). She found that low tolerance of ambiguity was a
strong predictor ofmagical thinking . High stress levels also had a greater effect on
magical thinking in individuals with a low tolerance of ambiguity. She suggested that
people with low tolerance are more likely to experience stress and a perception of loss
of control which may lead them to carry out certain behaviours to regain a sense of
control. Sometimes, even though the person may know the behaviours are irrational,
the rituals may be performed to be on the safe side. The person feels unable to stop
carrying them out. Keinan suggests that under normal circumstances these types of
beliefs are suppressed in normal adults, but that in times of stress and personal threat,
they are more likely to occur. There are clear parallels between this description of
normal adults under stress and subjects with OCD. Firstly, magical thinking is more
likely to occur if the person has a low tolerance of ambiguity which has been related
to OCD. Magical thinking seems particularly likely when low tolerance of ambiguity
interacts with high stress levels which also seems to be the case in some people with
OCD. Secondly, the way people with OCD cope with the feelings of losing control is
by carrying out some sort of ritual. The differences between superstitions in the
normal population and OCD have been noted (Leonard et al., 1993), but some of the
mechanisms such as low tolerance of ambiguity, stress levels and perception of control
underlying magical thinking and rituals in the normal population may be relevant to a
greater understanding ofwhy belief in or worry about overextended personal influence
are more common in an OCD group.
The role of perception of control in OCD is unclear as little research has been
conducted using a clinical OCD population. Schoor and Rodin (1984) compared the
motivation to control the environment in subjects with obsessive-compulsive,
depressive and normal personality traits. They did not find any overall difference in
motivation for subjects with obsessive-compulsive personality traits, but did find that
there was an increased motivation for control in specific situations. Further research
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would be needed to look at what particular circumstances may increase the motivation
to control in a OCD group.
Magical Thinking in other disorders
The relationship between magical thinking and stress suggests that magical thinking
may be higher in a population of subjects with clinical anxiety or other anxiety
disorders. Distinguishing the types ofbeliefs and schema in OCD and different
anxiety disorders such as panic disorder has been a focus of theoretical debate and
research (Salkovskis, 1985). Some studies have found that there have been no
significant differences on measures thought to be OCD-specific when comparing an
anxiety control group and an OCD group (Frost and Steketee, 1997). In the present
study, a normal control group was chosen because one aim of the study was to
investigate the presence of these types ofbeliefs in a normal population. An important
next step for this questionnaire and others such as the TAF would be to use an
anxious control group to investigate whether these types of beliefs were specific to
OCD or as a function of general anxiety. This present study indicates that worry
about personal extended influence is higher in a OCD group than a normal control
group, but this does not mean that worry about magical thinking does not occur in
other psychiatric groups. It also may be interesting to compare these types of beliefs
in OCD with group of people with schizophrenia to see in which way the beliefs
differ. For example, beliefs might differ in terms of how strongly they are believed to
be true.
Depression is often associated with OCD and therefore it is important to control for
the effect of depression to ensure that the variables specific to OCD account for group
differences in magical thinking rather than the depression. As would be expected, the
OCD group scored significantly higher then the control group on the BDI. When
looking at the OCD group and control groups, there is no significant correlation
between the BDI and the Magical Thinking Questionnaire or the BDI and the MOCI-
R suggesting that depression does not play a significant role in the results. Shafran et
al. (1996) found that the BDI significantly correlated with all factors of the TAF in
their obsessional sample. In the present study, only TAF-Moral correlated
significantly with the BDI, whereas TAF-Likelihood did not correlate significantly.
This difference in results may be due to the larger group size in the Shafran et al.
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study. Shafran et al. (1996) discussed the relative influence of thoughts and emotions
in OCD. They hypothesised that depression and anxiety may increase the frequency
and intensity of intrusive thoughts and inversely intrusive thoughts may also promote
depression, anxiety, guilt and other reactions.
The aetiology of magical thinking
The aetiology ofbeliefs in personal extended influence were also investigated in this
study. Tallis (1994) had suggested that specific experiences where a person had
thought something bad then it actually happened may contribute to the development
of beliefs in personal extended influence and thought action fusion. A significant
proportion (seven out of twenty) did remember such an event. Only two subjects
remembered a bad event, three remembered a good event and two subjects
remembered both a good and bad event. No statistical analysis could be carried out
because of the small numbers, so this discussion can only be speculative. Looking at
the descriptive data, the means of the Magical Thinking Questionnaire and the TAF-
Likelihood factor tended to be higher for subjects who remembered an event
compared to those who did not remember such an event. This gives some evidence
for the role of experience in the development of beliefs or worry about personal
extended influence. When looking at subjects who remembered a good event, the
means on the Magical Thinking Questionnaire seemed to be much higher than those
who did not remember a good event. However, there was no such difference for
subjects who remembered a bad event. The mean scores were similar for subjects
who remembered a bad event compared to those to did not remember such an event.
Although no hypothesis was made specifically looking at good compared to bad
events, this finding is at odds with what might be expected. It has been noted by
several authors (Tallis, 1995; Shafran et al., 1996) that subjects with OCD worry
about influencing the occurrence of negative events as opposed to positive events.
Therefore it would be expected the occurrence of a negative event rather than a
positive event would contribute to the development ofbelief in overextended personal
influence. In addition, some people who scored very highly on both the TAF and the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire did not remember any specific learning event. This
may have been because no such event had occurred and would suggest that an early
unusual experience was not necessary for the development of these types of beliefs.
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Another explanation is that such an event had occurred, but the person had forgotten
about it. A study by Wilhelm, McNally, Baer and Florin (1996) suggested that in fact
OCD subjects tend to remember negative words more than they remembered positive
or neutral words. This difference was not found in a normal control group. A third
possibility is that subjects were reluctant to disclose such an experience where they
had thought about harming someone and then it happened. In the two case studies
Tallis (1994) presented, both individuals had never previously told health
professionals about their experiences. The question also may have been asked in such
a way that it was not clear to the person what was meant and therefore did not elicit
relevant responses. A longer clinical interview asking subjects about the development
of their OCD in greater detail and asking about any early unusual experiences might
have given more information. Further research is needed to look more closely at the
relationship between early experiences, the development of beliefs and certain
characteristics ofOCD. An empirical question is whether bad events are more easily
accessed than good events as might be suggested by the Wilhelm et al. (1996) study.
They found that subjects with OCD encoded negative words, despite being instructed
to forget them, thus meaning the OCD subjects were more likely to remember this
material. Comparing the frequency of recall of these types of experiences in a normal
control group and other psychiatric populations to an OCD group would also be
interesting.
Methodology of study
There were several weaknesses in this study that have not been previously discussed.
Firstly, the study would be improved if there were greater numbers in each group.
Difficulties were experienced in the recruitment of subjects. Out of fifty one potential
subjects contacted, less than half actually took part. This difficulty has previously
been noted by other researchers and clinicians. Subjects with OCD are relatively rare
in mental health settings although epidemiological studies have shown that it is the
fourth most common psychiatric disorder (Robins et al., 1984). An average of eight
years lapses between the onset of the disorder and the person seeking help (Yaryura
Tobias and Neziroglu, 1983). A strength of the present study was that a clinical
sample was used and that subjects were diagnosed as having OCD. Many other
studies to overcome the above difficulty have looked at associations between
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measures of obsessionality and compulsivity with other measures in non-clinical or
general psychiatric samples which can make it unclear how their results are applicable
to OCD. The relatively small numbers in each group meant that the power of the
study was fairly low and low power may have explained the failure to find significant
results on some of the hypotheses. In order to overcome this difficulty and to increase
the power of the experiment to pick up significant results, more subjects would have
to be recruited into each group.
A second issue in the present study concerns the diagnosis ofOCD and the presence
of other psychiatric morbidity. The researchers were not specifically trained in
diagnosis, therefore this may have affected the reliability of the diagnosis ofOCD,
although the majority of subjects were recruited from mental health services where
they were currently being seen for OCD and the majority of subjects were currently
receiving either psychological and/or pharmacological help for OCD. Also, only the
OCD section of the SCID-P was used so additional diagnoses were not carried out,
although to screen for other psychiatric morbidity, subjects had to view OCD was
their main difficulty and were asked during the clinical interview whether they had any
other mental health problems. In addition, to control for the possible influence of
depression, severity of depression was measured by the BDI and was partialled out
where appropriate when using correlational analyses.
Thirdly, there may have other factors which accounted for differences in scores on the
Magical Thinking Questionnaire. The scenarios were not specifically matched for the
severity of the outcome. Therefore rather than intentionality and non-intentionality
accounting for the differences between the items, it may have been that the severity of
the outcome accounted for the differences. For example, a subject might be much
more worried about the possibility of being in a car crash than the possibility of a
house being burgled. This could be addressed by presenting the scenarios to groups
of subjects and asking them to rate how bad that outcome would be for them and
controlling for severity of outcome in a later study. Lastly, the two groups did differ
on educational levels and it was a possibility that a lower level of education might be
associated with a higher level ofmagical thinking thus accounting for the group
differences. As a supplementary check on the validity of the results, correlations




Research into OCD is working towards developing a empirically validated theory
about OCD in order to advance effective therapeutic techniques. While behavioural
therapy has helped many people with OCD, there is still a significant proportion of
individuals who do not respond to or drop out of this type of treatment. Medication
also is not effective for many subjects with OCD (Steketee, 1993). Therefore it is
important to develop alternative treatments such as cognitive therapy which may
prove more effective for those people or which have reduced drop out rates.
In terms of therapy, it would seem important to carefully and accurately assess beliefs
and attitudes, and the strength of particular beliefs during assessment. Measures such
as the TAF scale could be used to facilitate this process and help in assessing the belief
in personal extended influence. Therapists should also be aware that clients with
OCD may be reluctant to discuss previous experiences where they thought about
harm happening to someone which then actually happened and beliefs relating to this.
It is important to build up a trusting relationship where the person feels able to discuss
these types ofbelief as this may have implications for the way therapy proceeds.
Rachman (1993) thought that one aim of therapy could be to help the person to
differentiate between thoughts and actions. This could be done by employing
cognitive methods already used in OCD such as behavioural experiments or
challenging of thoughts. Tallis (1994) has pointed out that where people hold these
beliefs strongly and especially where they have developed because of an early learning
experience, cognitive therapy more in line with work looking at modifying delusions
may be more appropriate than the standard cognitive therapy for OCD. This takes a
more indirect approach where clients are encouraged to explore the alternative
evidence for a belief in the association between thoughts and events without being
urged to change their belief. The client is also likely to have a variety of beliefs which
may be interconnected and the clinician has to decide which beliefs are most
prominent and the best way to address these in therapy. For example, a belief in
overextended personal influence may be linked to excessive responsibility and beliefs
about controlling thoughts. The evaluation of the effectiveness of cognitive therapy
for OCD is still at a relatively early stage, but studies so far have indicated that it can
be at least as effective as behavioural therapy (Van Oppen et al., 1995).
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Summary
In summary, the study indicated that worry about the power of thoughts to influence
events and other people was higher in an OCD group than a normal control group.
OCD subjects seemed to be more worried about the influence of non-intentional
thoughts as compared to intentional thoughts. No difference in worry was found
between thoughts affecting events, behaviour, feelings or thoughts. The belief in
personal overextended influence appeared not to be present in all subjects with OCD
and probably causes significant distress to only a proportion of people with OCD.
This study found that there was no clear relationship between this belief and particular
compulsions and that the strength of this belief is likely to vary between individuals.
Some people hold the beliefvery strongly and others do not really believe that
thoughts can affect others or events, but worry about it, possibly because of a low
tolerance of ambiguity or a belief in excessive responsibility.
Research in this area contributes towards a clearer understanding of the cognitive
underpinnings specific to certain obsessional and compulsive behaviour and how these
might differ from the cognitive features of other disorders such as generalised anxiety
or psychotic disorders. The increasing development of reliable and valid measures
which tap the individual beliefs and cognitions underlying obsessive and compulsive
behaviours will hopefully help clinicians to better understand the nature ofbeliefs in
OCD and lead to the development ofmore effective, individually tailored therapy for
people with OCD, especially those who at present are not helped by the existing
treatments on offer.
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Appendix 1
RESEARCH INFORMATION SHEET
Some people experience distressing intrusive thoughts. These thoughts can often lead
them to carry out an action which may make them feel less worried in the short term. The
purpose of the study is to find out how people's beliefs and attitudes might be influencing
these 'obsessions' and 'compulsions'. Our aim is to increase understanding of obsessional
problems so that better ways of helping other people who have these difficulties can be
developed.
If you are interested in helping in the study, you can arrange an appointment with a
member of the research team. At this appointment you will be given more information
about the study and the researcher will answer any questions you might have. You will
have time to think about your decision to take part. If you are still unsure at this time,
another appointment can be arranged for you.
If you consent to take part, the researchers will first ask you some questions about your
difficulties. If you agree we would like to tape record this discussion. The tape will be
kept entirely confidential and will be erased once the information has been taken from it.
If you would prefer not to be recorded that would be fine.
After asking about your difficulties, you will then be given some questionnaires to
complete. Some of the questionnaires will ask you about the distressing thoughts and
obsessional problems and anxiety. Other questionnaires ask about general beliefs you may
have about yourself and others. The questionnaires will take approximately 1- 11/2 hours
to complete. All questionnaires con be completed at the first appointment, or if you prefer
you can arrange a further appointment to complete the questionnaires. At the end of the
appointment, there will be time for you to ask any questions you may have as a result of
taking part. A brief factsheet on obsessional problems with useful addresses will be given
out.
Your participation is entirely voluntary and should you decide not to take part, this will
have no effect on your future care. If you decide to participate, you are free to stop at any
time if you feel uncomfortable. We are required to tell you G.F you are taking part in the
study and to let them know what it involves. We will do this by letter after the
appointment.
Any information you give us will be treated as completely confidential and nothing that
could identify you will be published in any form. Questionnaires will be kept only for the
period of the research (approx 5 months) and will then be destroyed. Only members of the
research team have access to them. Once the research is completed, we can let you know
how to obtain the results if you wish.
If you have any queries you can contact a member of the research team or our independent
advisor.
Formore information please contact or for independent advice
Appendix 2
Dear
I am writing to give you some information about a research project that is being carried out
in . I understand that you therapist has already spoken to you about this. Thank you
for agreeing to be contacted. I would like to invite you to an interview so that you can find
out more about the research and decide if you would be interested in taking part.
The research is linked to the Clinical Psychology Training Course which is run by the
University of Edinburgh and Edinburgh Healthcare NHS Trust. The researchers are
qualified Clinical Psychologists or Clinical Psychologists in Training.
The study is related to people who experience intrusive and distressing thoughts which in
some cases can lead them to carry out an action as a way to reduce the discomfort caused.
The information sheet enclosed gives more details about the study and I would be grateful
if you could read through this. I have also enclosed a consent form which you should read
if you are interested in the research. At this stage you should not sign the consent form, but
you will be asked to bring this along to the appointment which will be arranged if you are
interested in helping with the research.
When you have read through the information sheet and the consent form, please could you
complete the confirmation slip enclosed. This will show us whether or not you wish to
attend for an introductory interview. If you are interested in attending, the time and place





Peter is Mark's cousin who lives across the street from him. Sometimes, he
experiences thoughts and worries that they might influence Mark's thoughts, feelings
or behaviours. Have you ever thought you could influence or affect people in these
ways?
1 .Peter is walking to work and a thought pops into his mind. Peter experiences the
thought that Mark will stub his toe on the stairs this morning. Peter tries to ignore the
thought and concentrate on all the work he has to to do today.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark will stub his toe?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 - - 2 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
2.Peter is at home w atching the television. Mark is away on holiday in Spain
Suddenly, he has the thought that Mark w ill be really enjoying his holiday.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the amount of enjoyment Mark
feels?
Rate the degree of influence
0 — 1 2 3 4 —- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
3.Peter is sitting at home eating his tea. The thought suddenly enters his mind that
Mark will phone him tonight.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence w hether Mark will phone
tonight?
Rate the degree of influence
0— - 1 2 —- 3 —- 4 - 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
4. Peter arranged to go for a drink tonight with Mark after work a few days ago. but
they haven't spoken since. All at once the thought comes into heis mind that Mark will
remember about tonight.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the way Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0- 1 — 2 —- 3 - 4—- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
5.Peter is in the house on his ow n and is watching his favourite television programme.
Mark is driving back from a w eekend away. Suddenly, out of the blue. Peter has the
thought that Mark will be involved in a car accident.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark is involved in an
accident?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 2 - 3 4 — 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
6.Peter is looking after Mark's house while he is away on holiday. The thought Pits
across Peter's mind that Mark's house will be broken into w hile he is away and that all
his things w ill be stolen. Peter tries to ignore the thought, but it keeps popping into his
mind and he cannot get it to go away.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark's house is
broken into?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 —- 2 -3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
7.Peter is listening to the radio . having his breakfast. A announcement comes up that
Peter's and Mark's favourite film star has just won an award. A thought suddenly
comes into his mind that Mark w ill also be pleasantly surprised by this.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this w ay influence the amount of surprise Mark
feels?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 2 - 3 -—4 -5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
S.Peter is reading the new paper at home and something reminds him of a timew hen
Mark's boss at w ork w as making cruel remarks to him. Briefly. Peter thinks about
Mark remembering these sorts of comments.
To what extent w ill Peter thinking in this way influence the w ay Mark might think
about his boss?
Rale the degree of influence
0- - I - 2 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
9.Peter is silting in a boring meeting at work. An image of the wonderful holiday lie
and Mark went on last year passes through his mind and he wonders whether that the
thoughts of this holiday will come into Mark's mind as well that day.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the way Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0- 1 2 3 — 4 - 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderate])- Much- Very much
1 O.Mark is going on holiday next week and has to go on quite a long flight. Peter
drops him off at the airport. On his way home, the thought that Peter will have a safe
flight briefly enters his mind.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark has a safe flight
Rate the degree of influence
0 I 2 - 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
1 1. Peter is sitting in his living room watching the news on the television. A report
comes up about a bad car crash which happened yesterday. Suddenly. Peter
experiences the thought that Mark will feel really sad about this car crash. Peter thinks
about this happening and about the types of sad feelings Mark might have.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this wa\ influence the amount of sadness Mark
feels?
Rate the degree of influence
0— 1 2 3 4 —- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
12. Peter briefly has the thought that Mark will have a huge argument with his wife
tonight and that they will really fall out.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence w hether Mark has an
arguement with his w ife?
Rate the degree of influence
0 — 1 - 2 —-3 - - 4 -—5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderatelv- Much- Very much
13.Peter is sitting at his desk at work. Suddenly the thought passes through his mind
that Mark will be having a bad day and will be feeling really down and depressed.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the amount of sadness Mark
feels?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 — 2 - 3 — 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
14.Peter is eating his breakfast. All at once, the thought enters his mind that Mark w ill
go out and enjoy himself tonight.
To what extent w ill Peter thinking in this way influence wTether Mark goes out tonight?
Rate the degree of influence
0-~ • 1 2 3 — 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little - Moderately- Much- Very much
15.Peter sudenlv skids on some black ice. He feels frightened and pulls over to calm
dow n. Briefly, the thought enters his mind about a time w hen Mark was driving and
skidded off the road and w onders w hether Mark might remember this time.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the way Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
16. Peter is meeting Mark for lunch this week. Briefly, he imagines that Mark w ill see
a ten pound note on the street this w eek. He pictures Mark w alking dow n the street and
noticing some money on the ground.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark finds a ten
pound note?
Rate the degree of influence
0 - 1 - 2 3 — 4 5
Not at all- Vers little- Little- Moderatelv- Much- Vervmuch
Sometimes Peter wants Mark to either do, feel or think something. Therefore lie tries
different ways to try to influence Peter's thoughts, feelings or behaviour.
1 .Peter is annoyed with Mark so he wishes that Mark will forget something important.
Mark works in an office and travels to work by bus. Peter thinks about Mark leaving
work in a hurry and wills him to leave his bus pass in a desk drawer.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark forgets his
buspass?
Rate the degree of influence
0- 1 2 - 3 4 ----- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
2.Peter wants Mark to feel happy because Mark has been moaning a bit recently. Peter
thinks hard about the type of happy feelings and thoughts he w ould like Mark to
experience. Peter wishes that Mark w ill cheer up a bit.
To what extent w ill Peter thinking in this way influence the amount of happiness Mark
might feel?
Rate the degree of influence
0 - I 2 3 4 —- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
3.Peter wants Mark to mo\ e his car so he can park outside his house. Peter thinks
about Mark getting up. w alking out of his house, dow n the street and to his car. He
imagines Mark drix ing his car away.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this way influence w hether Mark will mo\ e his
car?
Rate the degree of influence
0 - I — 2 3 - 4 - 5
Not at all- Very little- L.ittle- Moderately- Much- Very much
4.Peter w ants Mark to feel confident for a job interview. Mark has been thinking that
he has too little experience to stand a chance and is generally putting himself down .
He concentrates on the types of thoughts such as "I am as good as anyone else' that he
wants Mark to experience.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the w ay Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0— - 1 2 —- 3 4 —- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
5.Peter is at home and it is a very stormy night. Peter can hear that tiles are blow ing oi l
his roof and that his TV aerial is broken. Peter hopes that he is not the only one this
has happened to and secretly w ishes that Mark's TV aerial w ill blow olf as well. He
thinks about the wind catching Mark's aerial and blowing off the roof.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this w ay influence w hethcr Mark's TV aerial
blows off?
Rate the degree of influence
0 —- I 2 — 3 - 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
6.It has been raining a lot recently. Mark has just been boasting about his new
bathroom and how nice it is. Peter feels a bit jealous and decides that he wants Mark
to get a leak in his bathroom. He thinks about this happening and wishes it w ill
happen.
To what extent w ill Peter thinking in this way influence w hether Mark does get a leak in
his bathroom?
Rate the degree of influence
0 I - 2 - 3 — 4 - 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
7.Peter wants Mark to feel enthusiastic about a Christmas party he is ha\ ing which
Peter has in\ ited Mark to. He hopes that Mark w ill feel keen to go and be really
looking forward to it. He concentrates on the ty pe of feelings that Mark might
experience.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this w ay influence the amount of excitement Mark
might feel?
Rate the degree of influence
0 I 2 — 3 1 3
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
8. Mark ow es Peter £40 . but seems to have forgotten all about it. Peter feels
embarrassed to ask him for it back. Peter wants Mark to remember about the money
he owes so that he will pay it back soon. He concentrates on the types of thoughts he
w ould like Mark to experience.
To w hat extent w ill Peter thinking in this way influence the way Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 2 -— 3 - 4 - 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
9.Peter wants Mark to think nice and pleasant thoughts about him as lie is worried
Mark might not like him anymore. He concentrates on the types of thoughts that Mark
might have such as that he likes Peter. He wills that Mark to have these kinds of
thoughts.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the way Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 - 2 - 3 4 — 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
10.Mark has the possibility of a promotion at work. Peter hopes that Mark will get this
promotion. Mark works in an office and Peter imagines Mark's boss telling him that
He has got the promotion. Peter w ishes very hard that Mark will get this promotion.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this way influence w hether Mark gets his
promotion?
Rate the degree of influence
0 I 2 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Ver\ much
1 1 .Peter wants Mark to feel angry about a noisy neighbour near them w ho pi a) s loud
music constantly. Peter concentrates on the l\ pes of angry feelings he would like Mark
to experience. He wishes that Mark will feel a strong feeling of anger.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this w ay influence the amount of anger Mark
feels?
Rate the degree of influence
0 —- I 2 3 4 —- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
12.Peter is going round to Peter's house to use his computer. Peter hopes that Mark
will stay late at w ork tonight so Peter can use the computer at Mark's house without
being disturbed.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whetherMark stays late?
Rate the degree of influence
0- - 1 —- 2 —- 3 —- 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
13. Peter wants Mark to feel guilty about leaving rubbish in the street for Peter to clear
up. Peter concentrates on the sorts of guilty feelings he would like Mark to experience.
Peter wishes that Mark will feel a very strong feeling of remorse.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence the amount of guilt Mark feels'?
Rate the degree of influence
0- 1 2 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
14.Peter wants Mark to buy himself some new clothes to w ear at Mark's party next
week. Peter imagines Mark going to the shops and looking at some clothes. He
thinks about Mark finding something smart and new and deciding to buy it.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence whether Mark buys some new
clothes'?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 2 —- 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
15. Peter has fallen out witha mutual friend of Marks. Peter w ishes that Mark will
dislike this friend as well and will experience negativ e thoughts about him.
To w hat extent will Peter thinking in this w ay influence the way Mark might think?
Rate the degree of influence
0-- I 2 3 4 —- 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
16.Peter would like Mark to w in some money in the lottery this week. He thinks about
Mark choosing his numbers, paying for the ticket and taking the ticket home. He
imagines Mark in front of the television watching for his numbers and realising he has
w on.. He wishes that Mark will win some money.
To what extent will Peter thinking in this way influence w hether Mark wins any
money?
Rate the degree of influence
0 1 2 —- 3 4 5
Not at all- Very little- Little- Moderately- Much- Very much
Appendix 4
MOCI-R
Please rale each statement by putting a circle around the number that best describes
how much you agree with the statement, or how much it is true of you. Please answer
every item, without spending too much time on any particular item.
How much is each of the following statements Not at A Some Much Very
true of you? all little Much
1. I find rt very difficult lo make even lrivial decisions. 0 1 2 3 4
2. Touching the bottom of my shoes makes me very
anxious.
0 1 2 3 4
3. For me, thinking about making an obscene gesture feels
as bad as actually doing it.
0 1 2 3 4
4. I feel compelled to check letters over and over before
mailing them.
0 1 2 3 4
5. I am often upset by unwanted urges to harm myself. 0 1 2 3 4
6. I feel compelled to follow a very strict routine when doing
ordinary things.
0 1 2 3 4
7. If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this
increases the risk that he/she will actually have a car
accident.
0 1 2 3 4
3. My living space is unacceptably full of clutter because I
have great trouble throwing things away.
0 .1 2 3 4
9. I feel extremely contaminated if I touch an animal. 0 1 2 3 4
10. I worry far too much that I might upset other people. 0 1 2 3 4
11. I repeatedly experience the same unwanted thought or
image about an accident.
0 1 2 3 4
12. One of my major problems is that I collect excessive
amounts of useless things.
0 1 2 3 4
13. I repeatedly experience upsetting and unacceptable
thoughts of a religious nature.
0 1 2 3 4
14. I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things
over and over again.
0 1 2 3 4
15. I excessively check and recheck things like taps and
switches after turning them off.
0 1 2 3 4
16. I spend far too much time washing my hands. 0 1 2 3 4






17. I try to put off making decisions because I'm so frightened
of making a mistake.
0 1 2 3 4
18. I am often upset by my unwanted thoughts of using a
sharp weapon.
0 1 2 3 4
19. I almost always count when doing a routine task. 0 1 2 3 4
20. If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk
that he/she will actually fall ill.
0 1 2 3 4
21. I am afraid to use even well-kept public toilets. 0 1 2 3 4
22. I repeatedly experience the same upsetting thought or
image about death.
0 1 2 3 4
23. I feel upset if my furniture, ornaments, or other objects
are not always in exactly the same position.
0 1 2 3 4
24. Having violent thoughts feels as unacceptable to me as
violent acts.
0 1 2 3 4
25. I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant
thoughts that come into my mind against my will.
0 1 2 3 4
26. I take an excessively long time to dress in the morning. 0 1 2 3 4
27. I am often upset by unwanted thoughts or images of
sexual acts.
0 1 2 3 4
28. I often have trouble getting things done because I try to
do everything exactly right.
0 1 2 3 4
29. I am frightened of having any contact with bodily
secretions (blood, urine, sweat, etc.).
0 1 2 3 4
30. I often experience upsetting and unwanted thoughts
about illness.
0 1 2 3 4
31. I feel strongly compelled to keep things like lots of empty
boxes and newspapers just in case I need them later on.
0 1 2 3 4
32. I often feel compelled to memorize trivial things (e.g.,
licence plate numbers, instructions on labels).
0 1 2 3 4
33. My mean thoughts wishing a person harm can increase
the chance that something harmful will actually happen to
him or her.
0 1 2 3 4






34. 1 often feel strong unwanted urges to drive or run into
oncoming traffic.
0 1 2 3 4
35. 1 repeatedly check that my stove is turned off. even
though 1 resist the urge lo do so.
0 1 2 3 4
36. Having a blasphemous thought feels as sinful to me as a
sacrilegious act.
0 1 2 3 4
37. 1 feel very dirty after touching money. 0 1 2 3 4
38. After 1 have decided something. 1 usually worry about my
decision for a long time.
0 1 2 3 4
39. 1 often experience upsetting and unwanted thoughts
about losing control.
0 1 2 3 4
40. 1 am often very late because 1 can't get through ordinary
tasks on time.
0 1 2 3 4
41. I find it very difficult to touch garbage or garbage bins. 0 1 2 3 4
42. I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and
over again.
0 1 2 3 4
43. I avoid using public telephones because of possible
contamination.
0 1 2 3 4
44. I feel compelled to be absolutely perfect. 0 1 2 3 4
45. Having bad thoughts makes me feel like a terrible person. 0 1 2 3 4
46. One of my major problems is repeated checking. 0 1 2 3 4
47. I repeatedly experience upsetting and unwanted immoral
thoughts.
0 1 2 3 4
48. I find 'it almost impossible to decide what to keep and
what to throw away.
0 1 2 3 4
49. I am excessively concerned about germs and disease. 0 1 2 3 4
50. I am strongly compelled to count things. 0 1 2 3 4
51. I become very anxious when I have to make even a minor
decision.
0 1 2 3 4






52. For me, thinking bad things feels as bad as actually
doing bad things.
0 1 2 3 4
53. I frequently have to check things (e.g., gas or water taps,
doors, etc.) several times.
0 1 2 3 4
54. One of my major problems is that 1 am excessively
concerned about cleanliness.
0 1 2 3 4
55. 1 am often very upset by my unwanted impulses to harm
other people.
0 1 2 3 4
56. 1 spend far too long getting ready to leave home each
day.
0 1 2 3 4
57. 1 repeatedly check that my doors or windows are locked,
even though 1 resist the urge to do so.
0 1 2 3 4
58. If 1 have a thought or image of a bad thing happening to
people 1 care about, it makes me feel that 1 have put them
at risk.
0 1 2 3 4
59. One of my major problems is that 1 pay far too much
attention to detail.
0 1 2 3 4
60. For me, thinking unkindly about a friend feels as disloyal
as doing an unkind act.
0 1 2 3 4
61. lam often upset by unwanted thoughts or images of
blurting out obscenities or insults in public.
0 1 2 3 4
62. Touching the floor frightens me. 0 1 2 3 4
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Appendix 5
TAF SCALE
Please indicate using the key below how much you agTee or disagree with the following statements. Place
the number which corresponds with your answer in the brackets.
disagree strongly = 0
disagree = 1
neither agree nor disagree = 2
agree = 3
agree strongly = 4
1. Thinking ofmaking an extremely critical remark to a friend is almost as unacceptable to me as actually
saying it. ( )
2. Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a blasphemous action. ( )
3. Thinking about swearing at someone else is almost as unacceptable to me as actually swearing. ( )
4 .When I have a nasty thought about someone else, it is almost as bad as carrying out a nasty action. ( )
5. Having violent thoughts is almost as unacceptable to me as violent acts. ( )
6. When I think about making an obscene remark or gesture in church, is almost as sinful as actually
doing it. ( )
7. If 1 wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm. ( )
8. If I think about making an obscene gesture to someone else, it is almost as bad as doing it. ( )
9. When I think unkindly about a friend, it is almost as disloyal as doing an unkind act. ( )
10. If 1 have a jealous thought, it is almost the same as making a jealous remark. ( )
11. Thinking ofcheating in a personal relationship is almost as immoral to me as actually cheating. ( )
12. Having obscene thoughts in a church is unacceptable to me. ( )
13. If 1 think of a relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk that they will lose their job. ( )
14. If 1 think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this increases the risk that helshe will have a car
accident. ( )
15. If I think of a friend/relative being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that he/she will have a fall
and be injured. ( )
16. If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk that he/she will fall ill. ( )
17. If I think ofmyself being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that I will have a fall and be injured. ( )
18. If I think ofmyself being in a car accident, this increases the risk that I will have a car accident. ( )
19. If I think ofmyself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill. ( )
Appendix 6
Jane is Laura's cousin who lives across the street from her. Sometimes, Jane experiences thoughts
and worries that they might affect Laura's thoughts, feelings or behaviours. Even though you may
not believe logically that thought can affect anothers behaviour, have you ever worried that your
thoughts might affect an event or another person?
1. Jane is in the house on her own and is watching her favourite television programme. Laura is
driving back from a weekend away. Suddenly, out of the blue, Jane experiences the thought that
Laura will be involved in a car accident.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
the accident happened?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
2.Jane is looking after Laura's house while she is away on holiday. The thought flits across Jane's
mind that Laura's house will be broken into while she is away and all her things will be stolen. Jane
tries to ignore the thought, but it keeps popping into her mind and she cannot get it to go away.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
the house was broken into?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
3. Jane is reading the newspaper at home and something reminds her of a time when Laura's boss at
work was making cruel remarks to her. Briefly, Jane thinks about Laura remembering these types of
comments.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether a
person remembered a past event?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
4.Jane is walking to work and a thought pops into her mind. Jane experiences the thought that
Laura will stub her toe on the stairs this morning. Jane tries to ignore the thought and concentrate
on all the work she has to do today.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone hurt themselves?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
5. Jane is sitting in her living room watching the news on television. A report comes up about a bad
car crash which happened yesterday. Suddenly, Jane experiences the thought that Laura will feel
really sad about this.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone felt sad?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
6. Jane briefly has the thought that Laura will have a huge argument with her husband.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone got into an argument?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
7. Jane is sitting at her desk at work. Suddenly the thought passes through her mind that Laura will
be having a really bad day and will be feeling really down and depressed.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone felt depressed?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
8.Jane suddenly skids on some black ice. She feels frightened and pulls over to calm down. Briefly
the thought enters her mind about a time when Laura was driving and skidded off the road and
wonders whether Laura might remember this time.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
the a person remembered a past event?
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
9:Jane is annoyed with Laura so she wishes that Laura will forget something important. Laura works
in an office and travels to work by bus. Jane thinks about Laura leaving work in a hurry and leaving
her bus pass in a drawer.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone forgot something?
0 l 2-——3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
10.Jane is at home and it is a very stormy night. Jane can hear that tiles are blowing off her roof and
that her TV aerial is broken. Jane hopes that she is not the only one this has happened to and
secretly wishes that Laura's Tv aerial will blow off as well.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
this happened?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
11 .It has been raining a lot recently. Laura has been boasting about her new bathroom and how nice
it is. Jane feels a bit jealous and hopes that Laura will get a leak in her bathroom.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
this happened?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Veiy slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
12. Jane wants Laura to feel angry about a noisy neighbour near them who plays loud music
constantly. Jane wishes that Laura will feel a strong feeling of anger.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone felt angry?
0 l 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
13.Jane wants Laura to feel guilty about leaving rubbish in the street for Jane to clear up. Jane
wishes that Laura will feel a strong feeling of remorse.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone felt guilty?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
14.Jajie has falkn out wjth a mutual friend of Lauras. Jane wishes that Laura will dislike this friend
as well.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone disliked someone?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
•y
15.Laura owes Janes £40, but seems to have forgotten all about it. Jane feels embarrassed to ask for
it back. Jane wants Laura to remember about the money she owes so she will pay it back soon and
concentrates on the types of thoughts she would like Laura to experience.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect whether
someone remembered about the money?
16.Jane is going round to Laura's house to use the computer. Jane hopes that Laura will have to stay
late at work so Jane can use the computer without being disturbed.
Either now or in the past, how worried would you be that having this thought might affect w hether
someone stayed late?
0 1 2 3 4 5
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite Worried Very
worried worried worried worried worried
0 1 2 3 -—
Not Very slightly Slightly Quite
worried worried worried worried
4 5
Worried Very
worried
